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Abstract
Mach’s views on the nature of time have been unduly neglected. They are both more defen-
sible in their own historical context and more relevant to our own contemporary context than
has been appreciated. This essay provides an extended and comprehensive discussion of Mach’s
writings on time oering novel analysis and interpretation. Contra the prevailing current in the
secondary literature, Mach’s views on time are shown to be largely vindicated in the context of
late nineteenth century physics. Then, building upon this more historical project, we conclude
with a critical evaluation of the modern Machian view of time due to Barbour within the con-
text of relativistic chronometry as instantiated via pulsar clocks and atomic clocks. Once more,
considered analysis serves to support the Machian view. About time we go back to Mach.




An abusive empiricist who was confused about the nature of space and time? A extreme positivist who
mistakenly tried to eliminate temporal concepts from physics? An overhyped thinker whose displayed
breathtaking glibness in his awed criticisms of Newtonianism? A poor scholar who misunderstood
the ideas of his contemporaries leading to dim reformulations of their work? The purveyor of an
incoherent philosophy that led him to reject Einstein’s relativistic revolution?1
It is rather dicult to read much of the secondary literature on Mach’s analysis of space and time
without coming away with strongly negative impression of the abiding value of his thought. And yet,
it is equally dicult, even from supercial reading, to encounter Mach’s writings on space and time
without taking away a sense of the immense critical fecundity of his work. Mach’s view of time, in
particular, is evidently rich and subtle, and surely worthy of renewed and exhaustive analysis, despite
the proliferation of negative verdicts.
The purpose of this essay is two-fold. First, we will pursue a principally historical project of setting
out a new exegesis of Mach on time, as found in his published writings and correspondence. The core
historiographical goal will be to distinguish the key stages of development of Mach’s view of time
within a historically and textually adequate interpretation of his overall philosophical outlook. We
will seek to exculpate Mach’s views on time from the naïve positivist caricature, and articulate the
changing structure of his rich and complex view within three distinct stages of development.
Our analysis will be partially built around a specialisation to the case of time of the general analysis
of Mach’s thought due to Banks (2003, 2014, 2021) and Pojman (2011).2 We will also draw heavily
on exemplary scholarship of DiSalle (1990, 2002, 2020) and Barbour (2001, 2009a) with particular
reference to Mach’s contested analysis of inertial clocks. We will also reconsider the highly contested
question of Mach’s views on special relativity towards the end of his life. New insights into these
debates will be gained through a close reading of changes within various editions of Mach’s Mechanics
1These are almost verbatim renditions of critical remarks on Mach found within scholarly discussions of his work
in the period 1966-1995. As such, they are principally drawn from the so-called second wave of Mach scholarship (Black-
more 1972), an intellectual environment in which scientic realist scholars were reacting against the dominance of logical
empiricism tradition. Following the account of Wolters, as discussed by Banks, we can reasonably understand this as a
context in which “Mach scholarship was instrumentalized for a battle against the institutionalized positivism of the three
previous decades” (Banks 2014, p. 9) , “philosophers and historians of science of the ‘anti-positivist’ persuasion [were]
seeking to disavow positivism by hanging the sign ‘Positivism’ around Mach’s neck, and dismissing him as an ignorant
simpleton”, (Wolters 2011), translated in (Banks 2014, p. 9). We will return to the relevant details of each remark in the
course of the essay, where the direct quotations will be provided as appropriate. The sources (in order) are (Stein 1977;
Bunge 1966; Zahar 1977; Earman 1989; Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1995; Zahar 1981).




and relevant passages from Mach’s published correspondence.
Our further purpose in this essay is to pursue an interpretive, natural philosophical project of sit-
uating the Machian view of time in the context of both the Newtonian view of time and a detailed
analysis of relativistic chronometry in modern physical theory. A key aspect of Mach’s thought relat-
ing to the role of stability of the global environment will be distinguished building on the particular
analysis due to Barbour (2001). Arguably, it is this aspect of Mach’s analysis of time – which we shall
call the interconnection thesis – that make it most interesting and relevant for modern analysis of
time and its measurement. Will will emphasise this point by relating the Mach-Barbour account of
time measurement to modern treatments of relativistic chronometry drawing in particular on the
pathbreaking work of Tal (2016).
The success of our dual project will be judged in the provision of satisfactory answers to the fol-
lowing four questions:
i) How should we understand Mach’s view of time in the context of a textually adequate close
reading of his work?;
ii) To what degree and in what way did this view change during Mach’s lifetime?;
iii) Which aspects (if any) of Newtonian time do Mach’s arguments give us good reason to ques-
tion?;
iv) Does the Machian analysis of time have any signicant abiding relevance in the context of mod-
ern relativistic chronometry?
In order to answer these questions we will adopt a mixed methodology involving both the histori-
cal mode of analysis based upon a contextual analysis of Mach’s views on their own terms and the
philosophical mode of analysis via rational reconstruction of Mach’s view in modern terms.3 Whilst a
conation our two modes of analysis would be methodologically problematic, each mode has a proper
purpose when applied to its proper ends. In particular, so far as the historical project of understand-
ing what Mach thought about time, and thus the rst two questions, is concerned, the rational re-
constructions provided will function as supplements to, or summaries of, our main lines of analysis.
Then, in the context of the philosophical part of our project, and thus the second two question, the
rational reconstructions become our key tool in a comparative analysis which will draw upon both
modern Newton scholarship and contemporary literature on relativistic chronometry.
3The philosophical mode of analysis discussed here is very much in the tradition of Imre Lakatos (Lakatos 1970; Mus-
grave and Pigden 2016).
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We start, in §2, with a short analysis of the notions of time used by Newton in the Principia. The
purpose of this discussion will be to allow us to x our terminology for analysing views of time in
a suitably precise manner. Our main discussion commences in Section §3, with a consideration the
early Machian view of time. Our discussion will include an outline of Mach’s philosophical outlook,
a rational reconstruction of his early view of time, and a critical analysis of the attack on this view due
to Bunge.
Our reconstruction of Mach’s view will be built around ve claims regarding the nature of time,
three positive and two negative: The Phenomenological Thesis (the only temporal concepts that are
meaningful are those that can be continuously connected to experience via causal-functional rela-
tion); The Dynamical Relativity Thesis (temporal concepts can be meaningfully abstracted from rel-
ative variation since these continuously connected to experience); The Interconnection Thesis (all local
abstractions of time are subject to global eects since all motions of bodies are interconnected); The
No Dynamically Absolute Time Thesis (dynamically absolute time is meaningless since it cannot be
continuously connected to experience since there are no bodies whose motion to which it would
correspond; and The No True Time Thesis (the idea of there being one true time is meaningless since
change within the universe as a whole is not a concept continuously connected to experience). We will
assess the strengths and weakness of the early Machian view, and largely vindicate it in the context of
Bunge’s criticisms.
We will then, in Section §4 consider the transition to what we will call the middle Mach view. The
important distinction is between an early Mach view on time (up to 1888) and a middle Mach view
on time (1989 - 1905), that is bookended by the publication of the second edition of the Mechanics
and the arrival of the Einsteinian revolution. The middle Mach will be the focus of Sections §4.1 and
§4.2. Our particular concern will be understanding how modications in Mach’s view of time were
spurred by work of his contemporaries on inertial clocks and the foundations of statistical mechanics.
We will argue that important transition in Mach’s view of time between the early and middle
phase is marked by a change in his appraisal of the possibility for absolute temporal concepts to be ap-
proximate connected with experience in two key respects. First, his new understanding of the formal
viability of reframing absolute time in terms of inertial clocks leads him to accept that an approximate
absolute time is meaningful to the extent to which suciently isolated bodies can be assumed to play
the role of inertial clocks. We will provide a rational reconstruction of this change in view in terms
of a weakening of the No Dynamically Absolute Time Thesis. Second, his new understanding of the
possibility of measuring a change in global entropy leads him to accept that a single ‘true’ time for the
universe could be meaningful to the extent to which such a change could be connected to experience
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via such measurements. We will provide a rational reconstruction of this change in view in terms of
a weakening of the No True Time Thesis. In each case the partial weakening of Machian prohibition
of absolute temporal concepts can be situated in a consistent methodological empiricism that both
provides a basis for the change in view and residual reasons for a degree of Machian scepticism.
In Section 4.3, we will consider a contemporary reaction to the idea that a measure of time based
upon the entropy of the universe. This is the articulation of Mach’s rather thin suggestion by Julian
Barbour (following Mittestadt) in terms of a ‘second Mach’s principle’ (Mittelstaedt 1980; Barbour
1981). This idea will form the crucial link between Mach’s ideas on time and our critical discussion of
relativistic chronometry in the nal part of the paper.
The nal late Mach period (1906 - 1916) is marked by his ever more strident critique of atom-
ism and increasing ambivalence, after initial enthusiasm, towards Einstein’s theory of relativity with
which he was variously associated. Whereas Mach’s anti-atomism is clearly discernible and well docu-
mented, attribution to Mach of views on relativity is based upon a scattering of ambiguous remarks.
As such, the late view of Mach on time, as informed by relativity, is not something we are in a position
to reasonably reconstruct based on the currently identied sources (i.e. published work, unpublished
work, correspondence and documented recollections). We will review the most plausible critical ideas
of Mach with regard to relativity in a brief interlude from the main line of analysis in Section §5, con-
sidering some suggestive ideas with relation to the light postulate, but not building any fundamental
steps of our critical evaluation.
The nal part of this work, Section §6, will draw upon Mach’s ideas in an entirely dierent con-
text: relativistic chronometry. We will place particular focus upon the relationship between Mach’s
discussion of inertial clocks and a contemporary ‘Machian’ view of clocks and proper time espoused
by Barbour. Our discussion will be largely built upon renement and further articulation of the
views expressed within an exchange in 1993 between between Barbour and Frederick Hoyle and Ju-
rgen Ehlers, which was published in (Barbour and Pster 1995, 234-6), but has not previously been
subject to philosophical analysis. We will draw upon contemporary scholarship in both science and
philosophy of science regarding pulsar clocks and atomic clocks.
We will conclude that Mach’s view of time has been unduly neglected. It is both more defensi-





Linguistic imprecision is the bane of good philosophy. This is as true in discussions of time as it is
in any other context. In particular, it will prove highly instructive for our discussion of Mach’s view
of time to introduce a number of terminological distinctions relating to the status of time. Happily
we will be able to do this whilst introducing the view of time that Mach framed his own view in
opposition to, that espoused by Newton in the famous Scholium section in the Principia. Newton’s
key description of time is provided in paragraph 1 which run as follows:
Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own nature, without
reference to anything external, ows uniformly and by another name is called duration.
Relative, apparent, and common time is any sensible and external measure (exact or
nonuniform) of duration by means of motion; such a measure—for example, an hour,
a day, a month, a year—is commonly used instead of true time.4
The defence of this notion of time is then given in paragraph 55
In astronomy, absolute time is distinguished from relative time by the equation of com-
mon time. For natural days, which are commonly considered equal for the purpose of
measuring time, are actually unequal. Astronomers correct this inequality in order to
measure celestial motions on the basis of a truer time. It is possible that there is no uni-
form motion by which time may have an exact measure. All motions can be accelerated
4We have opted for the literal translation of the phrase ‘seu accurata seu inaequabilis’ as ‘exact or nonuniform’ rather
than ‘precise or imprecise’ as per (Newton 1999). This translation appears more suitable in the context of the discus-
sion of nonuniform motions in paragraph 5. The older Motte-Cajori translation (Newton 1962) has ‘accurate or non-
equitable’ which captures essentially the same point. Mach, following the 1872 German translation due to Wolfers, has
this as ‘genaues oder ungleiches’, which could reasonably be translated as ‘exact or unequal’ (Mach 2012a, p.250-1). The
key point, consistent between the translations, is that Newton is contrasting those motions which can be used to mark out
equal time intervals (i.e. inertial motion or non-accelerated rotations) from those non-uniform or non-equitable motions
which cannot.
5 The older Motte-Cajori translation (Newton 1962) renders paragraph 5 as:
Absolute time, in astronomy, is distinguished from relative, by the equation or correction of the apparent
time. For the natural days are truly unequal, though they are commonly considered as equal, and used
for a measure of time; astronomers correct this inequality that they may measure the celestial motions
by a more accurate time. It may be, that there is no such thing as an equable motion, whereby time may
be accurately measured. All motions may be accelerated and retarded, but the owing of absolute time is
not liable to any change. The duration or perseverance of the existence of things remains the same, whether
the motions are swift or slow, or none at all: and therefore this duration ought to be distinguished from
what are only sensible measures thereof; and from which we deduce it, by means of the astronomical
equation. The necessity of this equation, for determining the times of a phenomenon, is evinced as well
from the experiments of the pendulum clock, as by eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter.
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and retarded, but the ow of absolute time cannot be changed. The duration or per-
severance of the existence of things is the same, whether their motions are rapid slow
or null; accordingly, duration is rightly distinguished from its sensible measures and is
gathered from them by means of an astronomical equation. Moreover, the need for us-
ing this equation in determining when phenomena occur is proved by experience with
a pendulum clock and also by eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter.
The rst thing that is important to note about the Newtonian description of time, and accompanying
defence, is that the distinctions between dierent notions of time are three-fold; that is, between times
that are absolute or relative, true or apparent, and mathematical or common. There are good grounds
to treat these as three independent distinctions (Huggett 2012; Schliesser 2013; Brading 2016) and thus
to examine, one by one, what Newton means by time being absolute, true and mathematical.
Absolute can be read here in three importantly dierent ways (c.f. Friedman (1983, II.3)). First,
and most straightforwardly, we can think of absolute as a dynamical term; absolute time is insensitive
to changes in the motions undergone by material bodies. A dynamically absolute time will not vary
between two dynamically distinct universes related by a change in the motions of some particular
set of bodies (for example, two universe of three particles undergoing completely dierent physical
motions). Second, we can think of absolute as an invariance term; absolute time is invariant under
changes in the situation in time of the same set of dynamical motions. An invariant time will not
vary between two dynamically identical universes related by a change in the situation of the same set
of motions within time. (for example, two universe of three particles undergoing identical physical
motions but with the time labelling shifted forward a set amount). Third, and nally, we can think
of absolute in as an ontological term; absolute time is ontologically independent from the changes of
material things. In modern metaphysical terminology (which Newton himself would not have used)
this is to hold that time is substantival.
Each of these can be contrasted with a ‘relative’ notion of time. Time being dynamically relative
would then be sensitivity to changes in the motions undergone by material bodies.6 Time being rela-
tive in the sense of non-invariant would mean we can consider two distinct universes given respectively
6There is a close but non-exact connection between what we mean by ‘dynamical relativity’ here and the dynami-
cal relativity view espoused in Brown (2005) and later developed in, for example, Brown and Read (2018), Knox (2019),
Menon, Linnemann, and Read (2020). Unfortunately detailed examination of this connection is beyond the scope of the
current work. It is worth noting however that one of the major acknowledged inuences on Brown’s work is Julian Bar-
bour, who’s treatment of Mach will feature prominently in our our analysis. A further interesting relevant connection,
which warrants analysis but is beyond the scope of our present discussion, is the connection between the Machian view
of time and the existence and structure of ‘time observables’ in classical mechanical systems. See (Roberts 2014, §2-3) for
an excellent exposition of the formal concepts and attendant issues.
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by the dierent situations in time of the same set of dynamical motions – time would then provide
a surplus labelling structure. Finally, time being relative in the ontological sense would mean that its
existence depends upon changes in material things. This is the view of the ontology of time usually
called relationalism, and we will use relationalism only to indicate the ontological anti-substantival
view – often relationalism is conated with dynamical relativity, which is particularly problematic in
the context of discussions of Mach.
In the context of the discussion of time in the Scholium, we take it to be plausible to understand
Newton as defending a view in which time is (in our terminology) dynamically absolute, surplus and
substantival. As we shall see later, the focus of Mach’s objections are to both the dynamically absolute
part and the substantival part. In this context, it is worth briey considering two important points of
translation regarding the discussion of time in paragraph 5.
The rst issue relates to a divergence between the two main Latin to English translations regarding
strength of the language relating to time. The Cohen-Whitman translation (Newton 1999) which we
have quoted from in text lends itself more naturally to a reading in which time is dynamically absolute
and substantival. In particular, the reference to ‘truer time’ and the ‘gathering’ of duration from its
sensible measures is consistent with the idea of time as dynamically absolute and substantival. In con-
trast, the reading of Newtonian time as dynamically absolute and substantival is in tension with the
older Motte-Cajori translation of paragraph 5 (Newton 1962) provided in Footnote 5. In particular,
the reference to ‘correction’ and ‘more accurate time’ makes good sense in the context of a ‘strong
dynamical reading’ of the Scholium in which we take Newton to be reducing the meaning of the con-
cepts of time, space and motion to their successful dynamical application (Stein 1967; DiSalle 2006;
DiSalle 2016).7 As emphasised by Barbour (personal communication), the Motte-Cajori translation
allows for a reading in which Newton is at least cognisant of the possibility of building a maximally
accurate ‘corrected’ time purely based upon relative motions. Such a measure of duration would then
be dynamically relative and yet functionally equivalent to a dynamically absolute time.8 Signicantly,
7The strong dynamical reading leads to an interpretation whereby we strip away the metaphysical components of
these concepts entirely and thus the third substantival sense of absolute time would be absent. However, at least with
regard to space and time, the strong dynamical reading does not seem entirely textually adequate. In particular, as noted
by Huggett (2012), the discussion of the parts of space and time in paragraph 6 only really makes sense in the context of a
reading under which Newton attributes to space and time something more than the properties exhibited by mechanical
processes, c.f. (Huggett 2008; Slowik 2011)). For further discussion relevant to the dynamical view see (Rynasiewicz 1995a;
Rynasiewicz 1995b; Stein 2002; Guicciardini 2016; Slowik 2016). For detailed discussion of the notion of ‘absolute’ time
in full historical context see (Arthur 1995; Arthur 2019; Thomas 2018).
8It is worth noting here that the use of ‘deduced’ in the Motte-Cajori should be read in the context of a wider meaning
of ‘deduction’, in common usage at the time, which includes inductive inference, and thus not restricted to logically valid
inferences as in modern usage (Harper 2011, p. 38). This is signicant since it further supports the reading of Newtonian
time in which the assertion of absolute time is a claim regarding the limit of a sequence of increasingly rened abstractions,
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this strong dynamical reading of paragraph 5 in the Motte-Cajori translation also allows us to draw
close parallels between Newton’s conceptualisation of time and the view of time we will attribute to
the ‘middle’ phase of Mach’s thought.
This brings us to the second issue of translation which relates to the Latin to German transla-
tion of paragraph 5 that Mach quotes from in full. In the context of our analysis of Mach’s view of
time what is signicant rst and foremost is what Mach thought Newton thought about time. Thus
the issue of whether the strong dynamical reading of Newton is justied or not is largely indepen-
dent of our project. By contrast, what is of great signicance to our analysis is whether it is at all
plausible to take Mach to have taken Newton to have endorsed something like the strong dynami-
cal reading. As just noted, on the strong dynamical reading Newtonian time closely parallels Mach’s
own ‘middle’ view. Thus, if Mach’s reading of Newton could have plausibly taken such a form then
the dialectic between the two would become increasingly fraught. The signicant point here is that,
the Latin to German translation of paragraph 5 that Mach used makes implausible the strong dynam-
ical reading. In particular, the rendering of paragraph 5 (which might reasonably be categorised as a
mistranslation) makes reference to a non-comparative ‘true’ time that all but rules out the strong dy-
namical reading.9 Notwithstanding issues of Latin to English translation and the controversy within
contemporary Newton scholarship, it is thus evident that on Mach’s understanding Newton clearly
did endorse a view in which time was dynamically absolute. The crucial issue is therefore well settled
for our purposes.
Let us now turn to the question of how we should understand what Newton means by time
being ‘true’. What seems the most plausible and most textually well supported interpretation is that
rather that then ‘deduction’ of an ontological posit.
9Mach, following the 1872 German translation due to Wolfers (Mach 2012a, p.250-1), has paragraph 5 as:
Die absolute Zeit wird in der Astronomie von der relativen durch die Zeitgleichung unterschieden. Die
natürlichen Tage, welche gewöhnlich als Zeitmaasse für gleich gehalten werden, sind nämlich eigentlich
ungleich. Diese Ungleichheit verbessern die Astronomen, indem sie die Bewegung der Himmelskörper
nach der richtigen Zeit messen. Es ist möglich, dass keine gleichförmige Bewegung existire, durch welche
die Zeit genau gemessen werden kann, alle Bewegungen können beschleunigt oder verzögert werden; allein
der Verlauf der absoluten Zeit kann nicht geändert werden. Dieselbe Dauer und dasselbe Verharren ndet
für die Existenz aller Dinge statt; mögen die Bewegungen geschwind, oder langsam oder Null sein. Ferner
wird diese Dauer von ihren durch die Sinne wahrnehmbaren Maassen unterschieden und, mittelst der
astronomischen Gleichung aus ihnen entnommen. Die Nothwendigkeit dieser Gleichung bei der Bes-
timmung der Erscheinungen wird aber sowohl durch die Anwendung einer Pendeluhr, als auch durch
die Vernsterungen der Jupiters-Trabanten erwiesen.
Crucially, whereas the original Latin (‘ex veriore tempore mesurent’) and both English translations (‘on the basis of a
truer time’, ‘by a more accurate time’) frame absolute time here via a comparative, Wolfers has ‘der richtigen Zeit’, which
is purely positive.
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Newton means something like ‘privileged’, ‘unique’, or ‘universal’ (Huggett 2012; Brading 2016).10
The implication would then be that although there could be many dierent apparent times associated
with a physical system there is only one ‘true’ time. Time being ‘true’ can reasonably be understood
as a single consistent time labelling obtaining globally throughout the entire universe (i.e. everywhere
in space and time). That is, there exists a universal time by which, at the very least, the ordering of all
events is xed.
Finally, we can consider what Newton meant by time being ‘mathematical’. At a minimum it is
highly plausibly that what Newton has in mind here is that a mathematical time, as opposed to com-
mon time, has a uniform metric structure and can be represented as a single independent parameter in
an equation.11 What this means is that in contrast to common time, mathematical time provides a sin-
gle quantitive measure of duration that is applicable to all motions. Thus, the quantity of one unit of
mathematical time has the same meaning when applied to the sun’s motion as to the earth’s. By con-
trast, one unit of common time, as given by the motion of a particular body (say the day given by the
diurnal rotation of a celestial body) does not even in the case of a uniform motion provide a uniform
measure of time in the straightforward sense that it is quantitatively distinct from the corresponding
measure for a dierent body that is also assumed to be moving uniformly.
3 Early Mach on Time
3.1 Mach’s Philosophical Outlook
Whilst Mach has often been mischaracterised as a naïve positivist or phenomenalist who only believed
in the reality of human sensation, recent scholarship has pointed to a more nuanced reading.12 In
particular, drawing upon the accounts of Banks (2003, 2014, 2021) and Pojman (2011),13 we can isolate
10See (Schliesser 2013) for a dierent view.
11Along similar lines (De Gandt 2014, 209-13) provides an interesting discussion the Newtonian idea of a ‘uniform
uxion’ as a uniform independent time variable, and thus a mathematical time in our sense. A further possibility, explored
at length by (Arthur 1995; Arthur 2019) is that by mathematical time Newton also is indicating a further ontological
structure of time related to ‘intrinsic ow’, as founded on his method of uxions – see also (Guicciardini 2016). This
would be a further metaphysical element to Newtonian time, in addition to, but connected with, the substantival element
discussed above. For our purposes it will be safe to take a neutral stance regarding Newton’s commitment to ow. For more
details see Arthur’s fascinating discussion.
12The history behind the misreading of Mach and its connection to the logical empiricists is a complex and fascinating
story. See (Hintikka 2001; Pojman 2010; Banks 2014; Stadler 2021) for extended discussions. For a highly illuminating
analysis of the relationship between Mach’s thought and the logical empiricists in the particular context of the principle
of least action see (Stöltzner 2003). For a situation of Mach’s through in the wider scientic and philosophical intellectual
context of the early 20th Century see (Stöltzner 2021).
13As already noted, the view described here is also very much in the same spirit as the interpretation of Mach’s Analysis
of Sensations provided in (Preston 2021b). Moreover, in the context of contemporary Mach scholarship the broad un-
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the aspects of Mach’s philosophy most relevant for understanding his view of time as follows. The
most signicant idea is that of ‘elements’. Elements are characterised as neutral and monadic: both
sensations, when understood psychologically, and objects, when understood physically. Just as we
may think of sensations in terms of their material-neurological correlates, we might conceive of atoms
or molecules as ‘mental symbol[s] for a relatively stable complex of sensational elements’ (Mach 1914,
p.311). In the context of Mach’s wider framework of elements, the following aspects of his views on
the foundations of physics are then worth noting.
First, from Mach’s perspective, we should think of there being no logical or empirical loss in recon-
structing physics purely in terms of psychophysical elements. Second, on Mach’s view this approach
is heuristically fruitful, since it helps economise science and rid us of idle metaphysical conceptions.14
Third, Mach takes his view to be naturalistically well motivated, since it forces us to situate physics
within an evolutionary and anthropological context.15 Fourth, and most signicantly, we should cer-
tainly not understand Mach’s view as involving the claim that all unobserved elements are superuous
to science and should be eliminated from our theories. Rather, Mach insists that to ensure science per-
forms its proper function, unobserved elements must be established as appropriately connected with
experience in terms of a being part of a ‘continuous fabric of experience-reality consisting of events
and causal-functional relations’ (Banks 2014, p.33). Signicantly, in the context of such a framework,
the observable/unobservable distinction is not taken to be a fundamental one. Moreover, according
to Mach, theoretical abstractions are admissible so long as they are suitably circumscribed and can be
connected with experience by a series of approximations – c.f. (Feyerabend 1984, p.19).
This fourth point is of particular relevance for the rational reconstruction of Mach’s conception
of time that will be provided in the following sections. In particular, on the Pojman-Banks reading
it would be a mistake to assign to Mach a position of straightforward positivism or operationalism
about theoretical concepts. In particular, Mach explicitly did not think that ‘a concept or quantity
is metaphysical [and thus eliminable] if it is not operationally dened; hence every notion which
refers to hidden entities—i.e. to entities inaccessible to direct observation is metaphysical’ (Zahar 1977,
derstanding of Mach’s thought that we will work with here is now very much the established mainstream. Two recents
volumes which together provide a comprehensive overview of Mach’s thought are (Stadler 2019) and (Preston 2021a).
14It is important to note here that the principle of economy functions within Mach’s framework as a methodological
ideal or regulative principle, rather than a (hypocritically) metaphysical precept. See Stöltzner (1999) for discussion of both
this issue and other important aspects of Mach’s epistemology. Further insightful discussion of Mach’s epistemology can
be found in (Staley 2021).
15There is a suggestive analogy between Mach’s drive to situate physical concepts and physical reasoning within a his-
torical and developmental context, and Friedrich Nietzsche’s contemporaneous project for naturalising moral concepts
and moral reasoning, particularly as embodied in On the Genealogy of Morality, published in German in 1887 (Nietzsche
1998). See (Gori 2021) for a hugely insightful study of the connections between the thought of these two thinkers.
11
3.1 Mach’s Philosophical Outlook
p.202) or that ‘phenomena should constitute the whole domain of discourse of theories’ (Zahar 1981,
p.268). Whilst positivistic and operationalist views of theoretical concepts have indeed been defended
in Mach’s name, it is not the view that is identiable based upon anything like a careful and balanced
appraisal of his writings.
Rather, what we will call Mach’s ‘phenomenological thesis’ later is the weaker claim that theo-
retical concepts that we employ relating to time should be continuously connected to experience via
causal-functional relations. We use this phrase in the sense described by Banks as meaning theoreti-
cal concepts should be woven into a ‘continuous fabric of experience-reality consisting of events and
causal-functional relations’ (Banks 2014, p.33). On this view phenomena are not the ‘whole domain’
of discourse in science, but rather the ultimate subject matter to which all discourse can ultimately be
connected via the relevant casual functional relations, that themselves are ultimately reducible to his
neutral monadic elements. We will return to the implications of this functionalist form of phenome-
nalism later in the context of an interesting analogy, due to Hintikka (2001), between Mach’s view of
concepts and the notion of ‘identiability’.
In this vein, it is also worth remarking that as well as being clearly distinguishable from positivism
and operationalism, this viewpoint on theoretical concepts should also not be conated with an unal-
loyed commitment to conventionalism. In particular, as we will see Mach’s commitment to the con-
ventionality of choice in motions that are used to dene duration (mathematical time) is predicated
on assumptions about the relative stability of the environment. Thus, contra the otherwise exemplary
analysis of Tal (2016), we should not see Mach as a conventionalist who assumed, (supposedly) along-
side Poincaré, Carnap, and Reichenbach, that the conditions under which magnitudes of duration
are deemed equal to one another is arbitrary.16 Furthermore, it is certainly not the case that for Mach
the choice of a ‘coordinative denition’ for uniformity of temporal processes is independent of experi-
ence. As we shall see below, for Mach, such freedom essentially depends upon the scientist’s ability to
abstract away the environment, which in turn depends upon that environment being relatively stable.
There is thus, in fact, an interesting parallel between Mach’s actual view of time measurement and
that developed by Tal himself in the context of his detailed study of modern atomic clocks. We will
return to this connection in the nal section.
Finally, with regard to the motivation of his viewpoint, it is important to emphasise the centrality
of the economy of thought within Mach’s framework. Ultimately, Mach takes himself to be engaged
16This crucial dierence is supported by Mach’s own remarks: ‘Though I esteem Poincaré with his conventions, still
something is lacking in that approach in my opinion. Conventions are not at all arbitrary, but are pushed through with
gruesome pressure.’ Letter to Dingler, 26th January 1912 (Blackmore 1992, p. 100) Whether Poincaré himself held such a
view is at least contestable – see (Gray 2013, pp. 369-72).
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within a historical and evolutionary process of the continuous renement and re-articulation of sci-
entic thought (in the broadest sense of the term) in more ecient and eective terms. The economy
of thought is a regulative principle that drives this enterprise productively forward and motivates his
project of reconstructing physics purely in terms of psychophysical elements. There is thus a funda-
mentally pragmatic or methodological aspect to Mach’s form of empiricism, coming from a rather
dierent route to the type of epistemologically motivated empiricism associated with both the early
modern British empiricists and contemporary constructive empiricists.17
3.2 The Early Machian View of Time
Bearing Mach’s philosophical outlook in mind, let us review Mach’s main discussions of time. The
most signicant, and much quoted passage can be found at the beginning of the section entitled
‘Newton’s Views of Time Space and Motion’ in Mach’s Science of Mechanics, rst published in Ger-
man in 1883. Immediately following a full quotation of paragraph 1 of the Scholium and a quotation
of the bulk of paragraph 5, Mach continues:
It would appear as though Newton in the remarks here cited still stood under the in-
uence of the medieval philosophy, as though he had grown unfaithful to his resolve to
investigate only actual facts. When we say a thing A changes with the time, we mean
simply that the conditions that determine a thing A depend on the conditions that de-
termine another thing B. The vibrations of a pendulum take place in time when its
excursion depends on the position of the earth. Since, however, in the observation of the
pendulum, we are not under the necessity of taking into account its dependence on the
position of the earth, but may compare it with any other thing (the conditions of which
of course also depend on the position of the earth), the illusory notion easily arises that
all the things with which we compare it are unessential. Nay, we may, in attending to
the motion of a pendulum, neglect entirely other external things, and nd that for ev-
ery position of it our thoughts and sensations are dierent. Time, accordingly, appears
to be some particular and independent thing, on the progress of which the position of
the pendulum depends, while the things that we resort to for comparison and choose
at random appear to play a wholly collateral part. But we must not forget that all things
in the world are connected with one another and depend on one another, and that we
ourselves and all our thoughts are also a part of nature. It is utterly beyond our power
17For more on the economy of thought and the connection to pragmatism see (Banks 2014; Klein 2021; Uebel 2021;
Patton 2021).
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to measure the changes of things by time. Quite the contrary, time is an abstraction, at
which we arrive by means of the changes of things; made because we are not restricted
to any one definite measure, all being interconnected. A motion is termed uniform in
which equal increments of space described correspond to equal increments of space de-
scribed by some motion with which we form a comparison, as the rotation of the earth.
A motion may, with respect to another motion, be uniform. But the question whether a
motion is in itself uniform, is senseless. With just as little justice, also, may we speak of an
“absolute time”—of a time independent of change. This absolute time can be measured
by comparison with no motion; it has therefore neither a practical nor a scientic value;
and no one is justied in saying that he knows aught about it. It is an idle metaphysical
conception. [italics in original] (Mach 1919, pp. 223-4)
Similar sentiments, with a slightly clearer emphasis on the relevance of the environment can be found
in the parallel discussion in his Economic Nature of Physical Enquiry rst published in 1882 as part of
his Popular Scientific Lectures:
Newton speaks of an absolute time independent of all phenomena. . .For the natural in-
quirer, determinations of time are merely abbreviated statements of the dependence of
one event upon another, and nothing more. . .because all are connected and each may be
made the measure of the rest, the illusion easily arises that time has signicance indepen-
dently of all...The condition of science, both in its origin and in its application, is a What
it teaches us is interdependence. Absolute forecasts, consequently, have no signicance in
science. With great changes in celestial space we should lose our co-ordinate systems of
space and time. [italics in original] (Mach 1895, pp.204-6)
A point that will be of great signicance later, but is only implicit in the above, is that on Mach’s view,
it is not cogent to talk of an overall time for the universe. Consider the following from his History and
Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, rst published in 1872:
The universe is like a machine in which the motion of certain parts is determined by that
of others, only nothing is determined about the motion of the whole machine. If we say
of a thing in the universe that, after the lapse of a certain time, it undergoes the variation
A, we posit it as dependent on another part of the universe which we consider as a clock.
But if we assert such a theorem for the universe itself, we have deceived ourselves in that
we have nothing over to which we could refer the universe as to a clock. For the universe
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there is no time. Scientic statements like the one mentioned seem to me worse than the
worst philosophical ones.
People usually think that if the state of the whole universe is given at one moment, it
is completely determined at the next one; but an illusion has crept in there. This next
moment is given by the advance of the earth. The position of the earth belongs to the
circumstances. But we easily commit the error of counting the same circumstance twice.
If the earth advances , this and that occur. Only the question as to when it will have
advanced has no meaning at all. (Mach 1911, p.62-3)
Finally, we nd a specic, and thankfully more pithy, characterisation of what time actually is on
Mach’s view, within his Contributions to the Analysis of Sensations, rst published in 1886:
Space and time, closely considered, stand as regards physiology, for special kinds of sen-
sations; but as regards physics, they stand for functional dependancies upon one another
of the elements characterised by sensations. (Mach 1914, p.348).
We have emphasised the dates that these books were rst published in German here to highlight that
they are all from the ‘early Mach’. Let us draw from the quotations a rational reconstruction of the
early Mach view of time. We can do this in terms of ve interconnected claims:
i) Phenomenological Thesis: The only temporal concepts that are meaningful are those that
can be continuously connected to experience via causal-functional relations.
ii) Dynamical Relativity Thesis: Temporal concepts can be meaningfully abstracted from rel-
ative variation since they are continuously connected to experience.
iii) Interconnection Thesis: All local abstractions of time are subject to global eects since all
motions of bodies are interconnected.
iv) No Dynamically Absolute Time Thesis: Dynamically absolute time is meaningless since it
cannot be continuously connected to experience since there are no bodies whose motion to
which it would correspond.
v) No True Time Thesis: The idea of there being one true time is meaningless since change
within the universe as a whole is not a concept continuously connected to experience.
The rst, second and third claims constitute Mach’s positive view of time and are stable throughout
Mach’s writings. The fourth and fth, as we shall see, undergo signicant modications as he revises
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his views regarding the plausibility of grounding inertial reference frames and the entropy of the uni-
verse in experience. The third claim is the most obviously threatened by relativistic notions of time,
in particular proper time.
The early Machian view of time can be contrasted with that of Newton in a number of respects.
Plausibly, Mach would assert that time can be mathematical, in the sense of there being a uniform
temporal metric, given a stable environment. However, the early Mach clearly disagrees with Newton
regarding the coherence of a notion of time that is ‘absolute’ in a number of the relevant senses. In
particular, a) he denies that time is substantival, based upon the phenomenological thesis; b) he denies
that time is dynamically absolute, based upon the dynamical relativity thesis and the no dynamically
absolute time thesis; and c) he denies that time is true (i.e. globally well dened), based upon the no
true time thesis.
Mach’s objections to substantival time do not, of course, equate to an endorsement of relational
notions of time. Asserting that time is fundamentally a relation would be just as inconsistent with the
phenomenological thesis as taking it to be substance.18 It is also likely that Mach would be amenable
to the general idea that temporal concepts should be invariant: due to the phenomenological thesis,
we should demand that the realisation of our temporal concepts cannot vary between dynamically
indistinguishable universes. Most clearly, Mach is committed to time being dynamically relative and
apparent (i.e. not true), since he explicitly talks about time covarying with changes in the motion of
bodies and the absence of a single time well dened for the entire universe.
3.3 Bunge’s Criticisms of the Early Machian View
The Machian view on time has been subjected to a rather scathing critical appraisal by Bunge (1966).
Since Bunge’s choice of sources is such that he almost entirely focuses upon the ‘early’ Machian view
of time it will prove highly instructive to consider the objections rst, before tracing the subsequent
development to the ‘middle’ Machian view (i.e., 1889-1905).
Bunge makes three general negative claims regarding Mach’s view of time and one specic nega-
tive claim. Let us consider them one by one. First, Bunge criticises Mach’s supposed desire to elim-
inate the theoretical conception of time from mechanics on the grounds that: ‘it would be foolish
to eliminate the temporal concept: if we did it we would lose valuable information and we would be
unable to build theories of change’ (p.587). This criticisms is part of a general attack on Mach’s ‘nar-
row and dogmatic empiricism’ that, according to Bunge, led Mach to be hostile to theoretical physics
altogether. Needless to say, this line of attack is not easy to sustain in the face of what Mach actually
18Banks (2014, p.55) makes a similar point.
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thought and said. As noted above in terms of the phenomenological thesis, Mach was not advocat-
ing an elimination of all theoretical concepts but rather such concepts should be made appropriately
continuous with experience.
As pointed out by Hintikka (2001), it would be to entirely misread Mach to take him to be advo-
cating a radical revisionary programme for mechanics whereby theoretical terms such as mass should
be eliminated as primitive terms via explicit denition from an underlying theory. Hintikka takes
Mach to be advocating something closer to what econometricians call ‘identiability’, wherein ‘a pa-
rameter is identiable on the basis of an economic theory if and only if its value can be determined on
the basis of the theory plus possible data’ (Section I, accessed online).19 Although couched in much less
vivd language the spirit, if not the details, of Hintikka’s interpretation corresponds well with that of
Bank’s discussed above: Mach does not seek to eliminate theoretical conceptions but rather make sure
that they are woven into the ‘continuous fabric of experience-reality’. The view criticised by Bunge is
not the view held by Mach, rather it is best identied with the naïve positivist reading of Mach that
was, in fairness to Bunge, the mainstream view at the time of his article (Hintikka 2001; Pojman 2010).
It is worth noting here that a stronger reading of Mach’s sceptical view on spatiotemporal con-
cepts might be seen to be implied by the discussion of (Banks 2021, pp. 270-2). In particular, Banks
suggests that Mach’s early discussions imply a form of eliminativism: ‘Mach indicated his desire to
eliminate spatio-temporal representation from physics altogether, not just to reduce space and time to
spatio-temporal relations between bodies’ (p 271). This appears in contrast to our earlier discussion,
itself motivated by Banks, wherein we suggested Mach’s view was best read as a form of phenome-
nalist functionalism about time: i.e., the only temporal concepts that are meaningful are those that
can be continuously connected to experience via causal-functional relations. The seeming tension be-
tween the two readings is, however, rather less signicant than it seems. Plausibly, Mach can be read as
a phenomenalist-functionalist with regard to spatiotemporal theoretical concepts (the aspect we focus
upon) whilst also being a phenomenalist-eliminiativist with regard to spatio-temporal representations
(the aspect Banks is focused on). The important point is that Mach’s view of space and time is focused
on a reduction of space and time to causal-functional dependancies between his elements, which are
ultimately the basis for everything else. However, this does not mean temporal concepts per se become
meaningless, just as saying that money can be reduced to functional-social relations is not equivalent
to saying that the concept money is meaningless.
19It is not entirely clear how closely the notion of ‘identiability’ Hintikka’s provides in the relevant passage ts with
that deployed in contemporary applied statistics. A statistical model is given by a parametrized collection of probability
models for the same data. Such a model is called ‘identiable’ when each element within it yields a distinct probability
distribution for the data.
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The second line of criticism that Bunge oers against the early Machian view of time is more plau-
sible and can be understood independently of the rst. Bunge notes that for a functionally adequate
physical theory we require a complex concept of time that includes a quantitive concept of duration,
and thus a ‘mathematical time’. The point is a valid one. However, Bunge’s framing of Mach’s view on
this front is again inadequate. According to Bunge, Mach ‘had in mind pairs of simultaneous events
and was content with remarking that timing an event consists in pairing it to another event—its match
in the standard sequence’ (p586). It is dicult to follow precisely what Bunge means here, since there
does not seem to be any mention of ‘simultaneous events’ in Mach’s various discussions of time and
his uses of ‘comparisons’ and ‘dependence’ surely can only be read as quantitive functional relations
rather than imply the existence of purely qualitative temporal relations of ‘pairing’ and ‘matching’.20
This notwithstanding, Bunge is correct that Mach does not provide anything like a precise, mathe-
matised concept of relative duration. This is a key problem with the ‘early Mach’, and an issue that is
successively, but not entirely successfully, addressed in the later writings.
For the third general line of criticism oered by Bunge it is worth quoting the relevant passage in
full:
According to Mach “we select as our measure of time an arbitrarily chosen motion (the
angle of the earth’s rotation, or [the] path of a free body) which proceeds in almost par-
allel correspondence with our sensation of time.” This is false : (a) time standards are
supposed to be regular rather than arbitrary and are corrected or replaced as soon as they
are suspected of some irregularity; (b) since the beginning of scientic time reckoning
the perception of duration has had little saying in the choice of standards; it has none in
the adoption of ‘atomic’ (actually molecular) clocks; (c) what is decisive in the adoption
of a time standard is not our unreliable time sensation, which is rarely parallel to phys-
ical duration, but some theory which can justify the assumed regularity of the chosen
process. (Bunge 1966, p.587)
These criticisms look altogether more damming than the previous two. All three of Bunge’s points
labelled (a)-(c) are highly plausible and look, at rst sight, to directly contradict what is asserted in
the quote from Mach. However, putting the quote in context makes things look rather dierent. The
excerpt quoted was added to the Mechanics from the second 1889 edition onwards (so technically is
in our middle Mach period, 1989 - 1905). The full passage runs as follows:
20Furthermore, even if these are read as purely qualitative relations, this does not preclude a relational view of time
building quantitive temporal relations from them.
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My views concerning physiological time, the sensation of time, and partly also con-
cerning physical time, I have expressed elsewhere (see Analysis of the Sensations, 1886,
Chicago, Open Court Pub. Co., 1897, pp. 109-118, 179-181). As in the study of thermal
phenomena we take as our measure of temperature an arbitrarily chosen indicator of
volume, which varies in almost parallel correspondence with our sensation of heat, and
which is not liable to the uncontrollable disturbances of our organs of sensation, so, for
similar reasons, we select as our measure of time an arbitrarily chosen motion, (the angle
of the earth’s rotation, or path of a free body,) which proceeds in almost parallel corre-
spondence with our sensation of time. (Mach 1919, p.541) [italics in original]
Three points are worthing noting. First, when read in context it is clear that this passage is not
principally concerned with presenting Mach’s full and detailed view of physical time. Rather, the
phrase occurs in the context of a paragraph added to the second edition of the Mechanics with the
main object of highlighting Mach’s view of physiological time that is discussed in the Analysis of the
Sensations, which had been published in between the two editions of Mechanics. The parallel drawn
between physical and physiological time is thus serving to a large degree as a book plug. Moreover,
the relevant passage is certainly not intended to contradict the earlier view of physical time already
fully espoused in the earlier passages of the Mechanics quoted extensively above. This is fairly clear
already from putting the small excerpt used by Bunge in the context of the relevant paragraph, but
is undeniable in the context of a reading of the full text. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that
Bunge removes Mach’s italics from the phase ‘arbitrarily chosen motion’ that modies the meaning
compared to the phrase when read in context.
Second, and most signicantly, it is clear from the context of these remarks within the Mechanics,
and not least the implied meaning of the italics, that Mach is not suggesting that time standards are
‘arbitrary’ in the sense that any one is just as good as another, nor that those we should choose for
physical theory must be those that are based upon our unreliable time sensation. As is explicit from
what we called the interconnection thesis above, in fact Mach was greatly concerned with the need
for a stable environment with regular processes.21 Furthermore, Mach, in fact, even himself suggested
that the rotation of the earth would not be a stable enough process and, with impressive prescience
actually suggested that eventually something like an atomic standard of chronometry would emerge.
Consider the following from Economic Nature of Physical Enquiry, rst published in 1882:
21Admittedly, this then brings with it the problem of dening a suitable notion of ‘stable’ in purely relative terms.
While this is without doubt a dicult problem, it is a tractable one in the context of modern relational particle mechanics
(Barbour and Bertotti 1982; Barbour 1974; Barbour 2003; Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati 2014). Moreover, the need for
a relative notion of stability is certainly not the problem that Bunge is pointing to here.
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If it be objected, that in the case of perturbations of the velocity of rotation of the earth,
we could be sensible of such perturbations, and being obliged to have some measure of
time, we should resort to the period of vibration of the waves of sodium light, all that this
would show is that for practical reasons we should select that event which best served us
as the simplest common measure of the others. [italics in original] (Mach 1895, footnote
p.205)
The obvious interpretation of this passage is that the ‘simplest common measure’ is that which is
least sensible to perturbations. The choice of the period of vibration of the waves of sodium light as
‘simpler’ is on account of our greater practical ability to use such a natural process as a stable measure
of some other process, not due to a closer correspondence to an absolute time.
It seems fair to forgive Bunge for neglecting these footnoted remarks in one of Mach’s more minor
texts. What is less excusable is that the contrast between physiological time and physical time is in fact
explicitly drawn by Mach in the second of the passages from Analysis of the Sensations that is referred
to just before the text that is quoted by Bunge. Analysis of the Sensations, rst published in 1886, is
Mach’s other major text besides the Mechanics. The most relevant text runs as follows:
The time of the physicist does not coincide with the system of time-sensations. When
the physicist wishes to determine a period of time, he applies, as his standards of mea-
surement, identical processes or processes assumed to be identical, such as vibrations of
a pendulum, the rotations of the earth, etc. (Mach 1914, p.349)
That Mach specically directs the reader to this text in the full quote given above is the clearest indi-
cation that the views of physical and physiological time should be expected to be read together con-
sistently. On Mach’s view, physical and physiological time do not coincide quantitively since physical
time is constructed via the identication of highly regular physical processes but physiological time is
liable to the uncontrollable disturbances of our organs of sensation.22 However, the two do proceed
in almost parallel correspondence since physiological time is still ultimately also connected to regular
physical processes, albeit with less precision, such as the connection between the rotation of the earth
and the physiological daily cycle. Although it is not made explicit here, the obvious further implica-
tion of the comparison with thermodynamics in the full quote is the connection between what we
would now call the physiological and physical ‘arrows of time’. We will return to question of the ar-
row of time in the context of Mach’s middle view and the idea of the entropy of the universe in the
following section.
22Banks (2003, p. 246) notes in a similar vein that ‘Mach said he did not believe physiological conceptions of space,
time, and matter should be mirrored in the concepts of physical theory.’
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The important point is that a full and systematic reading of Mach’s extensive writings on time
in no way supports the interpretation given in the short excerpt given. In fact, Mach would agree
with at least the rst two of Bunge’s three statements, that is, it is entirely consistent with the early
Machian view of time to say that: a) time standards are supposed to be regular and are corrected or
replaced as soon as they are suspected of some irregularity; and b) the choice of standards in scientic
time reckoning has little to do with the perception of duration. The third statement was c) what is
decisive in the adoption of a time standard is some theory which can justify the assumed regularity
of the chosen process. Whilst there is no direct contradiction between this statement and Mach’s,
it is perhaps not in the spirit of his approach to theoretical reasoning. However, this is certainly not
because of a lack of reference to our unreliable time sensation. Rather, for Mach, what is signicant
is not merely the regularity of a particular process and the theory of that process, but also the stability
of the environment in which the process, and the scientists applying the theory, are embedded. This
crucial element of Mach’s thought will be rened and further articulated in the middle Mach view of
time to be discussed shortly.
The nal of Bunge’s criticisms is more specic and relates to the no true time thesis. Referring to
the passage from Conservation of Energy quoted above, Bunge notes that, on Mach’s view, there ‘is no
cosmic time’ and ‘[c]onsequently certain questions, such as the age of the universe, are meaningless
(p.586). Now, it certainly does appear consistent with the view of the early Mach to deny that the uni-
verse could have an age. And at rst sight, this seems deeply problematic for the adequacy of Mach’s
view. However, it is important to remember the relevant historical context of steady state cosmology.
Whilst there is a fairly straightforward (but not entirely unproblematic) meaningfulness to questions
regarding the age of the universe when asked in the context of an ‘big bang’ cosmology, in the context
of a steady state cosmology, where there is no expanding scale factor to play the role of a clock, Mach’s
view seems a more defensible one. This notwithstanding, Bunge does appear to have a point: if Mach
is asserting that it is conceptually inconsistent to talk about a single time for the universe, his theory
of time looks rather rigid and conceptually sparse in the light of modern cosmology. However, as we
shall see, there is an important development in Mach’s thought regarding the true time thesis during
what we are calling his ‘middle’ period. Before then, it will prove useful to consider the development
of Mach’s view on time spurred by the work of his contemporaries on clocks dened with reference
to inertial frames of reference.




Mach was not the only person thinking deeply about the conceptual foundations of Newtonian me-
chanics in the late nineteenth century. Between the publication of the rst edition of the Mechanics,
in 1883, and that of the second, in 1889, he became aware of work on the denition of inertial systems
that forced him to change, or at least adapt his view. Of most signicance is a proposal due to Lange
(1885) which built on earlier ideas due to Neumann (1870).23 It will prove well worth setting both pro-
posals briey, drawing upon the discussions of DiSalle (1990, 2002, 2020) and Barbour (2001, 2009a).
See also (Torretti 1996, §1.5), (Friedman 2001, p.76), (Brown 2005, p.19), (Pster 2014) and (Pster and
King 2015, §1.2).
Neumann’s idea was to transform reference to absolute space and time in Newton’s mechanics to
material bodies moving such that they can play equivalent functional roles. With respect to absolute
space this is his hypothetical body – ‘body alpha’ – with respect to which the motion of a free particle
is rectilinear. With respect to absolute time this is the time scale given by two freely moving particles.
The key idea behind this ‘inertial clock’ is that equal intervals of time will be marked out by any two
such particles via the period in which they move mutually proportional distances. The idea is then
that body Alpha and an inertial clock can be combined to give an inertial reference system with respect
to which the rst law of Newtonian mechanics can be said to hold.
As a solution to the problem of inertial motion, Neumann’s introduction of the mysterious body
Alpha seems to have all the benets of larceny over labour. Transmuting absolute space into a mysteri-
ous material body does nothing to remove the philosophical objections to the concept. That said, the
idea of an inertial clock looks very plausible, and the denition oered by Neumann leads naturally
into the proposal of Lange. The idea is to use the mutually uniform and rectilinear motion of three
free bodies to dene a standard for inertial motion of a fourth. Three bodies moving inertially can be
used to dene a coordinate system such that any fourth body can be judged to be moving inertially pre-
cisely when its motion relative to the coordinate system is uniform and rectilinear. Crucially, dening
such a reference frame will also provide means to dene correlates of absolute rotation and accelera-
tion. Lange appears to have provided a means by which Newtonian spatiotemporal absolutism can
be rendered entirely innocuous.
The signicance of Lange’s ideas for Mach’s various critiques of Newtonian mechanics is not a
23Mach had in fact discussed Neumann’s proposal already in his 1872 History and Root of the Principle of Energy (Mach
1911, p.75-80). We will consider the relevance of these remarks, which do not feature in the 1883 1st edition of the Mechanics,
shortly. Related proposals are those of (Euler 1748), (Kelvin and Tait 1867), (Streintz 1883), (Thomson 1884), (Tait 1884).
Mach makes explicit reference to the work of Euler, Neumann, Lange and Streintz in the appendix. For our purposes it
will be adequate to focus on his reaction to Lange. For discussion of Tait’s proposal see (Barbour 2000, pp. 101-4).
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matter of broad scholarly agreement. This is partially a function of the diering interpretations of
what Mach was actually proposing. On the one hand, DiSalle (1990, 2002, 2020) and Norton (1995)
take Mach to be proposing a redescription of Newtonian mechanics without absolute concepts; on
the other hand, Barbour (1995) takes Mach to be proposing a new theory of inertia. Settling this de-
bate would involve a lengthly investigation of the so-called Mach’s principle and the famous bucket
thought experiment and will not be attempted here.24
In our discussion, we will train our focus upon Lange’s work only so far as it relates to dynami-
cally absolute time (which is of course to focus on the aspect that he took from Neumann). In that
context, the two most relevant questions are: i) does the substitution of Newtonian time by an in-
ertial clock render Mach’s criticisms of dynamically absolute time obsolete? (I.e., does it contradict
the no dynamically absolute time thesis?); ii) is the suitably reformulated version of Newtonian time
consistent with the other aspects of Mach’s positive view of time? (I.e. does it contradict the phe-
nomenological, dynamical relativity thesis, interconnection thesis, and no true time theses?).
In a certain limited sense, the answer to the rst question is obviously yes. If we take the motion of
two freely moving particles to be continuously connected to experience, then absolute time becomes
meaningful via the denition of an inertial clock. And in this sense, Mach was clearly a little too quick
to dismiss absolute time as meaningless. In this light, it is strange to note that Mach’s reading of Lange
spurred him merely to add an appendix to the second edition of the the Mechanics (later expanded
and then included into the main text) but not to change the critical passages quoted above. In the
appendix he not only gives Lange’s work glowing praise but also seems to endorse the proposal:
Lange’s treatise is, in my opinion, one of the best that have been written on this sub-
ject. Its methodical movement wins at once the reader’s sympathy. Its careful analysis
and study, from historical and critical points of view, of the concept of motion, have
produced, it seems to me, results of permanent value. . .A system of coordinates with re-
spect to which three material points move in a straight line is, according to Lange, under
the assumed limitations, a simple convention. That with respect to such a system also a
fourth or other free material point will move in a straight line, and that the paths of the
dierent points will all be proportional to one another, are results of inquiry. . .we shall
not dispute the fact that the law of inertia can be referred to such a system of time and
space coordinates and expressed in this form. (Mach 1919, p.544-6).
24From a textual perspective it is surely of signicance here to follow DiSalle (2002, 2020) in placing emphasis upon
the additional discussions of Newton’s Corollary 5 that were added to later editions to the Mechanics. Unfortunately a




In the context of this passage and the presumed failure of the no absolute time thesis, various scholars
have taken Mach to be either guilty of a degree of stubbornness in not explicitly correcting his earlier
‘misunderstandings’ (Borzeszkowski and Wahsner 1995) or of revising his view such that Newtonian
space and time are not that conceptually objectionable after all, although they might be still method-
ologically problematic (DiSalle 1990). This latter view is well supported by change in tenor of Mach’s
later remarks in his Knowledge and Error, rst published in 1905:
. . . a pair of precisely dened physical processes that coincide in time at both ends and
are thus temporally congruent retain this property at all times. Such a precisely dened
process can now be used as a time scale, and that is the basis of chronometry. . . in each
measurement we use bodies, so that in setting up geometrical concepts we must start
from bodies. . .This seems to point to the fact that bodies are rigid and impenetrable,
which manifests itself when they touch each other, which is the basis of all measurement.
However, things have moved on since the beginning of the 19th century. We still need
rigid bodies to build our equipment, but we can use light interference to mark points
and measure stretches by wave length in seemingly empty space much more accurately
than would be possible by means of rigid bodies that abut and touch each other. It is
even likely that light waves in vacuo will furnish future physical standards of length and
time, in terms of wave length and period of oscillation respectively and that these basic
standards will be more appropriate and generally comparable than any others. Through
such changes space and time increasingly lose their hyperphysical character (Mach 1976,
pp.337-348)
Given such quotes, it appears that Mach has conceded the central point, and accepts that the process
of rendering absolute time perfectly respectable (i.e. not hyperphysical) is merely one of nding ap-
propriate practical means by which to construct clocks (i.e. ‘light’ clocks rather than inertial clocks).
It is without doubt true that Mach must have rethought or at least rened his view about abso-
lute time in response to the work of Lange and others. That said, it would be a mistake to read these
changes too strongly. The transmutation of absolute time into an inertial clock is only respectably
Machian to the extent to which force free bodies can in fact be identied, and of course, due to the
interconnection thesis, this is not strictly speaking possible. This point was explicitly noted by (Russell
1903) in the context of the proposal of (Streintz 1883) that parallels that of Lange. See also (Saunders
2013, §3) and (Barbour 2001, §12.3). It is also indicated in Mach’s own discussion of Lange’s proposal.
In particular, following the more positive discussion of Lange’s work in the later editions of the Me-
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chanics just quoted, Mach continues:25
. . . a number of years ago I was engaged with similar attempts. . . I abandoned these at-
tempts, because I was convinced that we only apparently evade by such expressions ref-
erences to the xed stars and the angular rotation of the earth. This, in my opinion, is
also true of the forms in which Streintz and Lange express the law.
In point of fact, it was precisely by the consideration of the xed stars and the rotation
of the earth that we arrived at a knowledge of the law of inertia as it at present stands,
and without these foundations we should never have thought of the explanations here
discussed. The consideration of a small number of isolated points, to the exclusion of
the rest of the world, is in my judgment inadmissible.
It is quite questionable, whether a fourth material point, left to itself, would, with re-
spect to Lange’s “inertial system,” uniformly describe a straight line, if the xed stars
were absent, or not invariable, or could not be regarded with sucient approximation
as invariable.
The most natural point of view for the candid inquirer must still be, to regard the law
of inertia primarily as a tolerably accurate approximation, to refer it, with respect to
space, to the xed stars, and, with respect to time, to the rotation of the earth, and to
await the correction, or more precise denition, of our knowledge from future experi-
ence. . . [italics in original] (Mach 1919, p.546-7)
We must, therefore, surely understand the ‘middle’ Machian view of time as involving a partial
revision, rather than a retraction, of the no dynamically absolute time thesis. This reading is fully
consistent with that of Barbour (1995), but in contrast, to DiSalle (1990, 2002), who sees a more sig-
nicant shift in Mach’s view on the cogency of the concept of absolute time and takes the quotation
just given to indicate a persistent methodological worry.26 Ultimately, the key to assessing the strength
of this shift in viewpoint is the extent to which the early Mach’s concerns with regard to absolute
space and time were already expressed in methodological terms. If we understand Mach’s overall em-
piricist outlook as itself being a principally methodological one, then the early Mach criticisms of
Newtonian absolute space and time are then largely in parallel to middle Mach’s criticisms of Lange’s
inertial system.
25Here Mach’s references to discussions earlier in the Mechanics have been removed.
26It is worth nothing that DiSalle’s methodological worry interpretation of the change in Mach’s thought with regard
to space at least is supported by the additional discussions of Newton’s Corollary 5 which were added by Mach to later
editions of the mechanics. See (DiSalle 2002; DiSalle 2020).
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Furthermore, we can nd already in the early Mach’s discussion of Neumann’s proposal, sceptical
remarks that already express the key methodological worry regarding inertial reference systems. In par-
ticular, as noted by Staley (2021, p. 39), in Mach’s 1872 History and Root of the Principle of Energy we
nd Mach pointing out the limitations of inertial reference systems in terms of the requirement for
the assumption of isolation of the reference body from the distant stars (Mach 1911, p.75-80). Clearly,
once more, Mach is in essence providing a methodological critique: ‘such a system of co-ordinates has
a value only if it can be determined by means of bodies’ (p. 77). Thus, while Lange’s more powerful
system evidently caused a degree of change in Mach’s thinking, in that he appears to have taken it as a
spur to thinking more precisely and carefully about the implications of such proposals, there is a high
degree of consistency across the various critical remarks directed at both Neumann and Lange, but
also at Newton. In particular, within the 1872 discussion of Neumann’s inertial reference system, the
1883 discussion of Newton on space and time, and the 1889 discussion of Lange’s inertial reference
system, Mach’s core worry is a methodological worry regarding the general validity of the assumption
of relative stability of our environment. Thus while we can plausibly see a degree of revision within
the discussion of Lange, there are good reasons, pace DiSalle, not to take this revision too strongly.
We will return to the issue of formulating the revised no dynamically absolute time thesis within our
rational reconstruction project at the end of this sub-section.
Other commentators appear at pains to underplay the signicance of the critical discussion of
Lange in the 2nd edition of the Mechanics. In particular, in a note added at the end of the paper by
Borzeszkowski and Wahsner (1995) in response to the discussion of Barbour (1995) in the same volume,
the authors appear to beg precisely the relevant question:
Mach’s criticism of Lange that one nds in some editions of his Mechanik shows that he
did not mention that, accepting - as he did - Lange’s construction of an inertial system,
for reasons of logical self-consistence, a fourth force-free material point must follow with
respect to one of Lange’s inertial systems a straight line (uniformly). The passage here
under consideration shows again Mach’s initial misunderstanding, not only of Newton
but also of Lange. This led him to a dim formulation. [italics in original] (p. 66)
Putting to one side the unnecessary condescending tone,27 this line of response does not seem very
plausible. Surely the internal logical consequences of Lange’s systems are not something that Mach
27It is an interesting, although perhaps not that interesting, question as to why Mach seems to generate such hostility
of language in his commentators. As noted by Norton (1995, p.44), in his discussion of Schlick’s commentary on Mach,
it is not dicult to isolate an ‘unpleasant, dismissive tone’ in many discussions of Mach. We have already seen this in
the criticism of Bunge and we nd a similar dismissiveness in Einstein’s private correspondence: ‘I do not inveigh against
Mach’s little horse; but you know what I think about it. It cannot give birth to anything living, it can only stamp out
harmful vermin’. (letter to Besso quoted in (Norton 2010, p.374). Similarly, in his highly inuential analysis, Howard
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has simply ‘misunderstood’ in this passage. Rather, it seems much more plausible to take Mach to
be pointing to the problems inherent in de-idealisaing Lange’s system within a real physical setting.
That reading, following Barbour, seems the only way of making sense of the phrase ‘with sucient
approximation’. Thus, the ‘misunderstanding’ reading of the passage advanced by Borzeszkowski and
Wahsner (1995) is simply not adequate.
More interestingly, Borzeszkowski and Wahsner (1995) point out that ‘Mach himself dropped this
passage later. In later editions, in particular in the last edition supervised by the author, Mach agrees
with Lange. There his point then was to state that Lange’s point of view need not be the last word.’ (p.
66). This claim is worth investigating, especially since the later editions are not available in translation.
First, we nd that the relevant passage is still present verbatim in the 6th edition (see p.256) which was
published in 1908. Thus the addition is present in unmodied form in the 2nd, 3rd. 4th, 5th and 6th
editions, and thus consistent within the middle Mach period.
In the 7th edition published in 1912, the last with which Mach was involved in the publication
of and that which the authors in question are presumably referring to, the evidence to substantiate
the claims of Borzeszkowski and Wahsner (1995) is at best slim. It is true that Mach’s explicit doubts
about the fourth material point are indeed no longer part of the relevant section. And thus, we might
think the change marks the emergence of a new late Mach position with regard to inertial clocks.
However, what we nd in place of Mach’s own critical remarks, quoted above, are in fact references
to recent critiques of Lange’s system, in particular due to Petzoldt – see (Mach 2012a, p.267-9). These
worries, according to Mach, are also of concern to others, and ‘cannot be eliminated so quickly’ (nicht
so rasch zu beseitigen sind). Mach concludes that, ‘until the fog clears’ (bis sich die Nebel verziehen) the
relevant discussion should be ‘temporarily suspended’ (vorläufig abbrechen) [author’s translations].
Thus, Mach’s position of positivity tempered by scepticism with regard to Lange’s system remains
Stein suggests that although he does not wish to use Mach as a ‘whipping-boy’, Mach’s mode of analysis is ‘abusive em-
piricism’ and Mach is accused of being ‘confused’ and showing ‘loss of critical control’ in his analysis of space, time and
motion (Stein 1977). A little later Earman (1989, §4.8) claims that ‘in all of Mach’s highly touted critique of Newton’s
argument from rotation, there is very little that is original’, notes his ‘breathtaking glibness’, and dubs his analysis of ro-
tation ‘relatively shallow’, and nally convicts him of the old (defunct) charge of ‘narrow empiricism’. What explains the
tone of condescension that commentators feel necessary to add to their discussions of Mach’s thought? Possibly, Mach’s
not always reliable historical scholarship and tendency towards strident hyperbole, is the root of the irritation. But then,
ironically, many of these commentators are guilty of the same sin with respect to Mach himself. Earman’s own ‘highly
touted critique’ of Mach’s views is itself ‘relatively shallow’, and contains only the single reference to Mach’s Mechanics
in the bibliography. Careful engagement with Mach’s work, as we have seen, does not lead to the simplistic empiricist
view criticised, and Mach’s arguments about space, time and motion, including the famous bucket discussion, need to be
set in the powerful and genuinely original context of his overall philosophical outlook to be properly evaluated. Perhaps
also, these rather unattering critical verdicts regarding Mach’s faculties are in virtue of a comparison with Newton and




Furthermore, it should be noted in this context, following (Pster 2014), that the criticism of
Lange’s system on the grounds that it provides no clear denition of ‘free particles’ nor means to
identify such objects, were also made by Gottlob Frege in an 1891 paper, and in fact accepted by
Lange himself in an article of 1902. Thus, Borzeszkowski and Wahsner (1995) are simply incorrect
both with regard to the plausibility of Mach’s own specic criticism of Lange in the 2nd to 6th edi-
tions, since thoughts along similar lines were commonly shared, and, moreover, with regard to his
supposed ‘agreement’ with Lange in the 7th edition.
To return to the point in hand, although the middle Mach never explicitly makes the point him-
self, the obvious idealisation upon which the Lange systems stands is that the reference bodies in
question can be assumed to be moving without the inuence of the gravitational interaction of dis-
tant bodies. It is only given such an assumption that one can treat them as force free bodies. Thus,
while it does seem correct to say that the middle Mach is wrong to focus upon eects of the motion of
the xed stars rather than the eects of their gravitational interaction, his essential point still stands.
Identication of a Neumann-Lange inertial clock, and thus an empirical stand-in for absolute
time, rests upon the assumption that eects of distant bodies can be neglected. As such, these con-
structions are, due to the interconnection thesis, strictly speaking not fully admissible within the
Machian framework of time. In the context of the reconstructed middle Machian view that we have
periodised up to 1905 we can thus reformulate the no dynamically absolute time thesis as follows:
iv?) Modied No Dynamically Absolute Time Thesis: Dynamically absolute time is not mean-
ingful since due to the interconnection thesis no bodies can be found to play the role of genuine
inertial clocks. However, an approximate absolute time is meaningful to the extent to which
suciently isolated bodies can be assumed to play the role of inertial clocks.
Put this way, the modication to Mach’s position does not appear to be an extreme one and, as Mach
himself notes, the essential points made in the original text of the Mechanics, are still valid despite the
new insights from Lange’s work. To return to our two questions, we thus have that i) the substitu-
tion of dynamically absolute time by an inertial clock does not render Mach’s criticisms obsolete, due
to the interconnection thesis; and ii) thus the other aspects of Mach’s positive view of time together
mean that Lange’s version of absolute time is still inconsistent with Mach’s view. There is an inter-
esting connection between Mach’s revised view and the contemporary model-based account of the
28This surely also holds also for the ideas of Neumann also, notwithstanding the remarks relating to Newton’s Corol-
lary 5 mentioned by (DiSalle 2002, p.177).
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epistemology of time measurement via the international network of atomic clocks due to Tal (2016).29
We will return to this connection in the nal part of the essay.
4.2 Universal Entropy and Time
We ended the previous section considering Mach’s remarks towards the inherent limitations of the
idea of an inertial system due to the interconnection of things. With some irony, in advancing such ob-
servations Mach was opening up ssures that would serve to partially undermine his claim that there
is no global time. The chain of reasoning behind this inference is due to Barbour (2001, §12.3). Let us
consider a potential response to the Machian objection to the denition of absolute time interval via
inertial clocks. The response runs as follows. It is true that we do not in fact have access to force free
bodies since we cannot rule out the inuence of the distant stars on local inertial motions. However,
if we have access to the causes of the forces exerted by the stars on the local bodies in question, then
we can simply take these into account, extrapolate the motion of force free bodies, and in so doing
construct a genuine, rather than merely approximate, inertial reference system. Thus the force of the
Machian objection is blunted.
We can expand upon this line of response in the particular context of time as follows. Consider a
pair of reference bodies identied as ‘force free’ and thus moving inertially. We can take the mutually
proportional motion of these bodies to provide an inertial clock that plays the role of absolute time.
The Machian objection to this arrangement is that on account of the ‘interconnection of things’ these
bodies will not in fact be free, rather their motion will always be subject to some deection from pure
inertial motion due to interactions with other bodies. However, as pointed out by Barbour (2001,
pp. 660-1), we can examine the sources of these deections in terms of identifiable causes. Once these
causes are identied we can in principle calculate what the motion of the reference bodies would have
been if they were in fact force free. This then allows us to extrapolate the time that would be given by
an inertial clock even although we do not in fact have access to any genuinely force free bodies.
Here Barbour suggests two lines of response, both in the spirit of Mach. First, is a general episte-
mological worry about whether the causes of the deection need always be identiable. In principle
there is no reason why the potential causes of deection from inertial motion need be exhausted by
the objects that can be identied in our neighbourhood. For example, Mach talked about the distant
stars, whose precise constitution and motion was not determined at the time or, even more explicitly
the potential for interconnections, possibly mediated via elds, to produce unknown causes:
29As already noted, a further interesting connection, which we unfortunately do not have space to explore, is to the
analysis of time in the physical relativity view developed by Harvey Brown. See in particular (Brown 2005, p.§6.2).
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The world remains a whole so long as no element is isolated, but all parts are connected,
if not immediately then at least mediately through others. The concordant behaviour of
members not immediately connected (the unity of space and time) then arises only ap-
parently by failure to notice the mediating links. The goal of the cosmic motion remains
unknown only because the segment that we can look at has narrow boundaries beyond
which enquiry does not reach. (Mach 1976, p. 346-7)
In modern terms we might consider the eects of dark matter or dark energy. The general point is that
we have good physical reasons to expect there to be non-identified (or perhaps even non-identiable)
causes of a particular local motion. This then indicates that our extrapolation process towards an
inertial clock may not be an entirely reliable one.
The second line of response that Barbour marshals on Mach’s behalf runs as follows. Let us ne-
glect the rst principally epistemological worry and assume that all causes of a particular local motion
can be identied. It is still the case that since Newton’s theory of gravitation is universal, a full speci-
cation of the causes of deection from inertial motion of any particular body will include all other
bodies in the universe. As noted by Barbour, Russell (1903) makes a related point when discussing a
proposal by Streintz that is similar to that of Lange. Furthermore, along similar lines, it has been noted
by Guzzardi (2014) in the context of a discussion of Mach’s view on the causation, determinism and
the conservation of energy that [on Mach’s view] ‘each modication of a part of a system necessarily
reverberates throughout the entire system’ (p.1286) [italics in the original]. Thus the Russell-Barbour
line of argument can be reasonably taken to be in the Machian spirit, even if it was never explicitly
put-forward by Mach himself.
By appeal to this counterargument the Machian can point out that to arrive at a genuine inertial
clock our extrapolation procedure would need to take into account every body in the universe. Al-
though we may in principle be able to derive a perfect measure of time based upon our extrapolated
inertial clock, in deriving such an ‘absolute time’, we have had to take into account the motion of
all bodies in the universe and therefore construct a ‘true time’. Interestingly, a true time constructed
in this manner would be a deeply relative notion of time since it will covary with any (dynamically
signiant) change in the motion of any material body. As Barbour notes, this idea of a time derived
from the motion of all bodies is no philosopher’s fantasy. It is closely connected to the astronomical
notion of ephemeris time and can be constructed explicitly in analytical formulations of Newtonian
mechanics (Barbour 2009b).
Recall that in his early view Mach is explicit in his denial of the possibility of a global time. This
denial is most explicit in his 1871, Conservation of Energy. What is signicant for our understanding
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of the progression in his thought, is that in the text the denial of a global time is explicitly connected
to the proposal by W. Thomson and Clausius that the second law of thermodynamics can be applied
to the universe as a whole (see p. 62). This strong and persistent connection between the idea of the
entropy of the universe and the idea of universal time runs throughout Mach’s work. However, as
discussed by (Brush 1968) and (Banks 2003), Mach’s views on thermodynamics changed during the
mid-1890s, not least spurred by the reaction to the ideas of Boltzmann on irreversibility. What is im-
portant for our current purposes is that his view of the plausibility of talking about the entropy of
the universe seems to have undergone a shift from an early phase in which the concept of universal
entropy is taken to be meaningless to the middle and late phase in which universal entropy becomes
something that could possibly be determinate30 This, in turn, has an implication for his view on the
plausibility of a global time.
Consider the following four quotes. First in the Popular Scientific Lectures, rst published in 1894:
It is to be remarked further, that the expressions “energy of the world” and “entropy of
the world” are slightly permeated with scholasticism. Energy and entropy are metrical
notions. What meaning can there be in applying these notions to a case in which they are
not applicable, in which their values are not determinable? If we could really determine
the entropy of the world it would represent a true, absolute measure of time. In this way
is best seen the utter tautology of a statement that the entropy of the world increases
with the time. Time, and the fact that certain changes take place only in a denite sense,
are one and the same thing (Mach 1895, p.178)
Then, in Principles of Heat, rst published in 1896:
Hasty readers of my Conservation of Energy have supposed that I there (p. 62) denied the
existence of any irreversible processes. But there is no passage which could be so under-
stood. What I said about the expected “death of heat” of the universe I still maintain, not
because I suppose all processes to be reversible, but because phrases about “the energy
of the universe”, “the entropy of the universe”, and so on, have no meaning. For such
phrases contain applications of metrical concepts to an object which cannot be mea-
sured. If we could actually determine the “entropy of the universe”, this would be the
best absolute measure of time, and the tautology which lies in the phrase about heat-
death would be quite cleared up. (Mach 2012b, p.439).
30With more than a little irony, given his rather low opinion of the quality of Mach’s thought, there is thus a clear
connection between the early Mach’s denial of the coherence of universal entropy, and Earman’s devastating ‘not even
false’ criticisms of the notion of the universal entropy in the context of the so-called past hypothesis (Earman 2006).
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Then, in the extra material added to the appendix of the third addition of the Mechanics in 1897:
I have endeavoured also (Principles of Heat, German edition, page 51) to point out the rea-
son for the natural tendency of man to hypostatise the concepts which have great value
for him, particularly those at which he arrives instinctively, without a knowledge of their
development. The considerations which I there adduced for the concept of temperature
may be easily applied to the concept of time, and render the origin of Newton’s concept
of “absolute” time intelligible. Mention is also made there (page 338) of the connection
obtaining between the concept of energy and the irreversibility of time, and the view is
advanced that the entropy of the universe, if it could ever possibly be determined, would
actually represent a species of absolute measure of time. (Mach 1919, p.542-3)
Finally, in a later letter to Adler, quoted by (Banks 2003, p.220-1), he remarks:
For me Time-Space questions are essentially physical questions. The riddle of time will
be solved, I believe, through the correct conception of the second law.
There is, therefore, a discernible shift from an earlier position that the change in entropy of the uni-
verse, and therefore a global time, is ‘meaningless’, to a weaker position that such an entropy change
is a thing that could possibly be determined.31 Certainly, it would be over-reading to take Mach to be
positively asserting that a true time exists; however, it is also clear that he has moved past his earlier
complete denial of the conceptual plausibility of a ‘time for the universe’. We can suitably reformulate
the fth claim regarding time as a conditional claim:
v?) Conditional True Time Thesis: True time is meaningful if universal change can be contin-
uously connected to experience via the determination of the change in universal entropy.
Modifying this thesis has great signicance for the overall structure of the Machian view. In par-
ticular, rather than, as with the early Mach, denying that true time is a cogent notion, it is clear that
31There is also a natural connection here to Bank’s more phenomenalist-eliminiativist interpretation of Mach on space
and time. In particular, as detailed in (Banks 2003, §14) there is a discernible shift in the middle Mach period towards an at-
tempt to interpret the physical meaning of space and time via statistical and thermodynamical concepts. Ultimately, there
need not be a direct tension between Bank’s view and the phenomenalist-functionalist reading we have putforward since
Mach might plausibly be understood to be an eliminiativist about spatio-temporal representations and yet a functionalist
about spatio-temporal concepts. Moreover, as Bank’s himself admits, the remarks his interpretation is built upon are rather
‘dark’, and his interpretation is suggested as a ‘tempting’ rather than a necessary one. The key point, contra Banks, is that it
is not at all clear that thermodynamic concepts could ever provide a foundation for a concept of time that is functionally
adequate for physical theory. In particular, it is not at all clear whether an entropic time is sucient to provide a suitable
metric structure. This is in direct contrast to the Lange type inertial systems idea, which as Mach was well aware provides
a formally rigorous means of reconstructing the metric structure of space and time via the motion of bodies.
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the middle Mach would assert that if the change in the entropy of the universe were determinable,
then a spatially global ‘true time’ would be induced. Universal entropy induces a dynamically rela-
tive (spatially) global mathematical time given by a measurable physical quantity. Crucially, however,
as Mach would probably have been aware, there is good reason to expect that universal entropy, if
it could be determined, would not be a monotonically increasing function. The time ordering it in-
duces would thus not be temporally global since we cannot preclude the possibility of recurrence, and
thus a reversal in the sign of universal entropy change, leading to a temporal reordering.32 Thus, the
‘true’ time that forms part of the middle Machian view of time only partially fulls the Newtonian
idea: it is spatially but not temporally global.
4.3 Mach’s Second Principle
The core problem for theories in which time is dynamically relative is xing a determinate temporal
metric – a mathematical time.33 We saw this problem in the early Machian view of time as pointed
out by Bunge. Furthermore, the middle Mach does not, himself, provide any clear and explicit re-
sponse to this problem. That said, the remarks about ‘interconnection of all things’ and the connec-
tion with universal entropy suggest a new and powerful line of reasoning. This has been developed by
Mittelstaedt (1980) and Barbour (1981), and called by them, in honour of Mach, the ‘second Mach’s
principle’. Barbour’s most explicit discussion (p.46) of the second Mach’s principle runs as follows:34
Newton had justied the concept of absolute space by means of the undoubted fact of
inertial motion; this is reected in the fact that there exist distinguished frames of ref-
erence in which the Newtonian laws of motion take a canonical and especially simple
form. To counter this argument of Newton’s for the existence of absolute space, Mach
had suggested that inertial motion is somehow governed causally by the distant matter in
the universe. This could then explain why some frames of reference are clearly preferred
to others without there being any apparent reason for this preference. Following a sug-
gestion of Einstein, this is now called Mach’s Principle. In the case of time too, we nd
32This is an implication of what was shown by Boltzmann by reference to Poincaré’s recurrence theorem in his 1897
reply to Zermelo’s criticism of the H theorem. See (Brush 1966) for English translation of the original papers and (Brush
1968, p.204) for a short discussion.
33For discussion of a related problem for Leibniz’s notion of time see (Rescher 1979, p.66), (Vailati 1997, p.136), (De
Risi 2007, p.273), and Arthur (1985, 2014, 2021).
34We reproduce this lengthly quote in full here since the original text is only available within a relatively rare collec-
tion, with all the other essays in German. Furthermore, Mittelstaedt’s original remarks, translated here by Barbour, are
in an untranslated German monograph. Since, on the view of this author, the second Mach’s principle is of considerable
physical and philosophical signicance, the genesis of its formulation is of more than incidental importance.
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a similar curious preference by nature for a particular time measure. Prima facie, time
is just a one-dimensional sequence, a topological labelling of successive states. It is then
striking fact that there exists a unique (up to shift of origin and change of scale) time
metric for which the laws of motion take a particularly simple form. What is the origin
of this distinguished time metric?
Now we have already seen that Mach was greatly impressed by the “peculiar and pro-
found connection of things". Mittelstaedt poses the question: Did Mach envisage – even
less concretely than in the case of inertia – that one might eventually be able to discern,
in the connection of things, a causal explanation for the existence of a distinguished time
metric? Could, for example “. . . the cosmic entropy causally inuence the rate of all other
clocks in some as yet unknown manner” (Mittelstaedt 1980, p.25)? Although Mach said
nothing explicit to the eect, Mittelstaedt, correctly in my view, thinks it is a surmise
suciently well justied to be honoured with the name Second Mach’s Principle. Its
verication would require establishing that “. . . certain cosmic changes of state (of the
entropy or radius of the universe) causally inuence the rate of local changes of state.
Further, it would he necessary to establish which of the known interactions brings about
this inuence” (Mittelstaedt 1980, p.25).
This second Mach’s principle was never explicitly endorsed by Mach himself. Within it we nd
the seeds of a modern form of Machianism about time. In particular, the idea of a ‘second Mach’s
principle’ is developed and rened within Barbour’s later writing with various collaborators forming
one of the central planks of his approach to relational particle mechanics (Barbour and Bertotti 1982;
Barbour 1974; Barbour 2003; Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati 2014), general relativity (Barbour 1994;
Barbour 2000), and ultimately shape dynamics (Barbour and O’Murchadha 2010; Gomes et al. 2011;
Barbour et al. 2013; Mercati 2018).35
Within these approaches the problem of xing a determinate temporal metric within a theory
with dynamically relative temporal structure is arguably solved. Detailed consideration of these de-
velopments is beyond our current project since it would concern formal developments in the spirit of
Mach’s views of time, rather than Mach’s views proper. The kernel of Mach’s thought that persists
in modern Machian ideas about time is the interconnection thesis, and it is that specic aspect rather
than the more general (and sophisticated) features of modern Machianism about time that will be
35Further useful resources for discussion of modern Machian views of time are (Earman 1989; Pooley and Brown 2001;
Pooley 2001; Buttereld 2002; Anderson 2004; Rickles 2006; Rickles 2007; Thébault 2011; Thébault 2012; Gryb and
Thébault 2016; Anderson 2017; Thébault 2021). An outstanding recent paper oering new insights into the analysis of
systems with nonzero angular momentum within relational theories of mechanics is (Gomes and Gryb 2021).
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of focus of the nal section of this essay. In particular, we will argue that, contrary to common intu-
itions, the interconnection thesis is tenable in the context of relativistic chronometry. Before then, we
will consider late Mach’s own view of relativity theory, with particular reference to time.
5 Late Mach on Einstein
Ernst Mach died in February 1916, some eleven years after publication of Einstein’s monumental 1905
special relativity paper and only a few months after the publication of the eld equations of general
relativity in November 1915. The inuence of Mach’s thought on Einstein has been subject to sus-
tained critical investigations based upon a wealth of relevant sources. The most plausible view is of a
partial yet principally positive inuence. Mach’s ideas were a crucial element in the heuristics which
Einstein made use of in the reasoning that lead him to special and general relativity, but were even-
tually superseded within his settled view of the implications of relativity theory (Renn 2007; Norton
2010).36
In contrast, Mach’s reaction to Einstein’s work is both scantily documented and, from what can
be clearly discerned, rather ambiguous. It is worthwhile, therefore, to pose the question of why it is
worthwhile to consider the views of the late Mach on Einstein at all. In particular, given that there
is no published text, unpublished archived manuscript, nor detailed archived correspondence from
which we could reconstruct the view on relativity theory of the ‘late Mach’, one might reasonably
consider why this period of his thought is not simply passed over in silence within our analysis – or
at least left open until the possible future discovery of new textual sources.
The answer to the question of why it is worth considering Mach’s views on relativity comes in
two parts. First, it is worth considering Mach’s reaction to relativity on the grounds that his supposed
resistance to this great pillar of modern physics, along with his stubborn refusal to entertain the atomic
hypothesis, has been, and continues to be, one of the main lines of argument used to reject Mach’s
36For the earlier, more contentious literature – largely framed by a desire to draw implications for the realism debate
– the reader should see: (Holton 1970), (Blackmore 1972, §15), (Schaner 1974), (Zahar 1977) (Feyerabend 1980), (Zahar
1981), (Feyerabend 1984), (Hentschel 1985). Further discussions can be found in (Pais 1982, pp. 282-8), (Torretti 1996, pp.
194-202), (Blackmore 1992, §7,8,14), (Norton 1993), (Hoefer 1994), and (Barbour and Pster 1995, §1).
To this author at least, the tendency towards drawing general inferences regarding Mach’s philosophical outlook, both
positive and negative, based upon the inuence of Mach on Einstein is somewhat perplexing. Such reasoning seems to
operate under something like a fallacious inference to the normativity of the actual: to the degree to which Mach’s phi-
losophy inuenced Einstein’s particular scientic advances, that philosophy is vindicated. Needless to say, if the history of
science has taught us anything, it is that successful scientists can be driven by peculiar philosophical methodologies and
generally sound philosophical methodologies need not always lead to scientic success in a particular case. The fruitful-
ness of Mach’s philosophy of science must surely be evaluated, if it is to be evaluated at all, in a more general context driven
by a rational analysis of scientic practice, not by tracing the idiosyncratic lines of its historical inuence on a particular
individual, no matter how monumental that individual’s achievements.
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view of theoretical physics in general.37 Thus, considering Mach’s reaction to relativity is signiant
to our general goal of advocating for the abiding relevance of Mach’s thought for the analysis of time
in physical theory. Second, from what can be reasonably reconstructed, at least one of the principal
concerns that Mach had about relativity theory relates to the universality of the light postulate. This
line of critical reasoning has an interesting connection to contemporary debates regarding our analysis
of light clocks that we feel it is instructive to highlight, for future work as much as for the present
analysis.
Let us then turn rst to Mach’s few published remarks on relativity. None of these is particularly
decisive but together they do at least suggest the appropriate tone of thought. In (Mach 1909) he notes
the following:
Space and time are not here conceived as independent entities, but as forms of the depen-
dence of the phenomena on one another. I subscribe, then, to the principle of relativity,
which is also rmly upheld in my Mechanics and Wärmelehre (H. Minkowski, Raum
und Zeri, Leipzig, 1909) (Blackmore 1992, p. 170)
and also, seemingly more critically:
Spaces of many dimensions seem to me not to be so essential for physics. I would only
uphold them if things of thought such as atoms are maintained to be indispensable, and
if, also the freedom of working hypotheses is upheld (Blackmore 1992, p. 269)
Next, in an article a year later, (Mach 1910), we nd the following remarks:
Even if the kinetic physical world picture, which in any case I consider hypothetical with-
out intending thereby to degrade it, could ‘explain’ all the physical appearances, I would
still hold the diversity of the world not to be exhausted, because for me matter, space, and
time are also problems, which moreover, the physicists (Lorentz, Einstein, Minkowski)
are also moving closer towards (Blackmore 1992, p. 172)
Finally, we get to the infamous discussion which appears in the preface to the edition of the Optics
which came out in 1921 but is marked with the date 1913.38 Parts of this text are often quoted out of
37This is very much the line of thought indicated by Earman (1989, p.84) in his (rather intemperate) discussion of
Mach’s views on space, time and motion.
38The authenticity of the preface has been questioned by Wolters (2011), who claims it was forged by Mach’s son. This
claim has been rejected by a number of scholars. For critical discussions of the issue and the plausibility of Wolters’ claim
in English see (Blackmore 1989), (Holton 1992) and, more sympathetically, (DiSalle 1990). References to further analysis
in German are given in (Banks 2014, p. 250). Given the equivocal nature of Mach’s remarks, and the comments from his
letters, the forgery issue does not seem particularly pivotal.
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context, obscuring the evident nuance in Mach’s view. Let us therefore consider the entire passage in
full:
I gather from the publications which have reached me, and especially from my corre-
spondence, that I am gradually becoming regarded as the forerunner of relativity. I am
able even now to picture approximately what new expositions and interpretations many
of the ideas expressed in my book on Mechanics will receive in the future from the point
of view of relativity.
It was to be expected that philosophers and physicists should carry on a crusade against
me, for, as I have repeatedly observed, I was merely an unprejudiced rambler, endowed
with original ideas, in varied elds of knowledge. I must, however, as assuredly disclaim
to be a forerunner of the relativists as I withhold from the atomistic belief of the present
day.
The reason why, and the extent to which, I discredit the present-day relativity theory,
which I nd to be growing more and more dogmatical, together with the particular
reasons which have led me to such a view—the considerations based on, the physiol-
ogy of the senses, the theoretical ideas and above all the conceptions resulting from my
experiments—must remain to be treated in the sequel.
The ever-increasing amount of thought devoted to the study of relativity will not, in-
deed, be lost; it has already been both fruitful and of permanent value to mathematics.
Will it, however, be able to maintain its position in the physical conception of the uni-
verse of some future period as a theory which has to nd a place in a universe enlarged
by a multitude of new ideas? Will it prove to be more than a transitory inspiration in the
history of this science? (Mach 1926, vii-viii)
The only other lines of evidence regarding Mach’s attitude towards relativity come from his corre-
spondence. Many of Mach’s own letters are lost, and the only scrap of relatively clear evidence we
have is a remark in a letter from Petzoldt to Mach indicating that Mach had expressed a view that
‘something still seems to be lacking’ regarding the ‘epistemological side of the relativity principle’
(Blackmore 1989, p. 521). Petzoldt himself consistently argued against accepting the universal con-
stancy of the speed of light on what he took to be Machian grounds, and in his letters to Mach, this
objection is the most frequently mentioned. Given this, we can see plausibility in Blackmore’s specu-
lative inference that the light constancy axiom was at least partially the cause of Mach’s ambivalence
regarding relativity. He puts this idea as follows:
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There is no evidence known to this commentator that Mach ever expressed himself con-
cerning the light constancy axiom, but it is hard to imagine how he could have accepted
it given Mach’s own epistemological theory of relativity. Mach had long believed that all
physical phenomena had to have relation with other physical phenomena, but the light
constancy axiom suggested that the velocity of light in a vacuum was independent of all
other physical phenomena, that is, was ’metaphysical’ from a phenomenalist perspective.
The sceptical attitude of Mach’s main followers [Petzoldt and Dingler] as mentioned
above helps conrm this. (Blackmore 1989, p523)
Dingler was particularly critical of multi-dimensional geometry and maintained an extremely cordial
correspondence with Mach, who praises him in the preface to the 7th edition of the Mechanics.
Deploying reasonable, but still speculative, inference based upon the views of his correspondents
and his published remarks, we might rationally reconstruct the late Mach’s view of relativity as fol-
lows:
R1 The assumption of four dimensional spacetime within relativity theory is a dispensable work-
ing hypotheses and need not be the basis of future physics.
R2 The universality of the speed of light within relativity is epistemologically problematic.
Rationally reconstructing the late Mach’s view in these terms helps us to move away from an un-
reasonably binary question of whether he ‘endorsed’ or ‘rejected’ relativity theory. Neither extreme
position is well supported by the published texts, letters or recollections of Mach’s contemporaries.
Moreover, blanket rejection would surely not t with his overall philosophy of science in any case.39
This more nuanced view of Mach’s view on relativity also helps us recognise when the advocates
of modern Machian views are genuinely in the spirit of Mach. In particular, with regard to R1, we
might see the Shape Dynamics approach to relativity theory as distinctly Machian (Gomes et al. 2011;
Barbour 2012; Gryb and Thébault 2016; Mercati 2018). Furthermore, there is a suggestive connec-
tion between, on the one, hand R2 combined with Mach’s analysis of inertial clocks, and, on the
other hand, contemporary debates regarding the status of light clocks in special and general relativity
39This is, of course, to take a rather neutral interpretation of the quotes. One might also, plausibly, put things the other
way round and extrapolate Mach’s view of relativity along very similar lines as those that dened his view of atomism. He
does not deny that relativity has its empirical successes (just as atomism has its own), however when he doubts that the
core posits (constant speed of light) and formal representations (spacetime) will play a role in future physics he does not
even give relativity the role of a future ‘eective theory’. When he says that the amount of thought devoted to relativity will
not be lost because it will be of permanent value for mathematics, one could read this in a deationary way, as indicating
the theory will be of no lasting physical value.
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(Maudlin 2012; Fletcher 2013) and the ‘physical relativity’ approach pioneered by Brown (2005).40 We
will leave exploration of these more theoretical connections between Mach’s thought and relativistic
clocks to future work. In the next section we will consider Machianism and relativistic chronometry
as embodied in real physical clocks; in particular, pulsar clocks and atomic clocks.
6 Modern Mach and Relativistic Chronometry
Recall that the Machian interconnection thesis was that all local abstractions of time are subject to
global eects since all motions of bodies are interconnected. This thesis would seem to straightfor-
wardly fail for physical clocks in both special and general relativity given the assumption that physical
clocks directly measure proper time.
Proper time can be rigorously dened in the context of a relativistic spacetime (M, gab) as follows
(Malament 2012, §2.3): let γ : [s1, s2] → M be a smooth future-directed timelike curve in the man-









where ds is the line element.
It is a basic principle of relativity theory (the clock hypothesis) that clocks read the passage of
elapsed proper time along their world-lines.41 This then means that in relativity theory clocks by hy-
pothesis measure a time which is local in the sense that it only depends upon consideration of prop-
erties of the relevant curve relative to the metric along a (possibly arbitrary small) segment of clock’s
world line. We then have a clear example of a measure of time that is not global in the sense that it is
only subject to purely local eects.42 Thus the interconnection thesis appears untenable in the context
of relativity theory.
40This, in turn, connects to a the fascinating question of when we should understand light as moving along null
geodesics. See (Asenjo and Hojman 2017a; Asenjo and Hojman 2017b; Menon, Linnemann, and Read 2020; Linnemann
and Read 2021).
41Brown and Read (2018) argue that the clock hypothesis is not strictly realised and is better understood as ‘clock
condition’. In a similar vein, one might view the clock hypothesis as constituting the definition of clocks as objects such that
measure proper time. Relatedly, Arthur (2010) argues that the clock hypothesis is not needed as an independent postulate
in special relativity but can rather be regarded as as stating the criterion for an ideal clock. Malament (2012, p. 136) gestures
in a similar direction, and further suggests a connection to the role of idealisations in the context of Newtonian inertial
clocks. We will return to this interesting connection in what follows.
42Here and below ‘global’ is used to simply mean ‘not local’ and thus not depending solely upon the properties of the
metric over a region that can be assumed to be arbitrarily small. This is a much weaker sense of global than the technical
sense used in the foundations of general relativity – see for instance (Manchak 2013).
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In this section we will consider this claim in detail. What we will nd is that consideration of the
idealisations and approximations that must be parameterised in order to accurately operate a physical
clock serve to rescue the interconnection thesis, or at least a weaker form of it. Thus, the dialectic with
regard to physical clocks, in general, bears strong parallels to our discussion of the particular analysis
of inertial clocks and Mach in §4.1. Here we will examine this chain of argument with particular refer-
ence to the two physical instantiations of a clock system that provide the best means of chronometry
currently available to humanity: pulsar clocks and atomic clocks.43
6.1 Pulsar Clocks
The best means of natural time measurement is that based upon so-called millisecond pulsars. To what
extent do such physical means of relativistic chronometry t with the Machian viewpoint? Before we
can answer this question, let us rst review the key physical details of pulsar clocks following Lorimer
(2008).
Pulsars are rapidly rotating highly magnetised neutron stars. As the neutron star spins, charged
particles are accelerated along magnetic eld lines such that they form a beam. These accelerated par-
ticles then emit electromagnetic radiation that can be detected terrestrially at radio frequencies as a
sequence of observed pulses. Each pulse is produced as the magnetic axis, and therefore radiation
beam, crosses the observer’s line of sight in each rotation cycle. Various populations of pulsars exist
within the universe with diering physical characteristics depending upon their origin and whether
they are part of binary system. A distinct sub-population of ‘millisecond pulsars’ are so-called due to
pulse periods of the order of 1 to 30 milliseconds.
Over time these millisecond pulsars show a very small change in their pulse period, usually of the
order of 10−19s/s. This is because the neutron stars are in essence ‘celestial ywheels’, and will display a
gradual slowdown (i.e., increase in the pulse period) as the outgoing electromagnetic radiation carries
away rotational kinetic energy. This local rate of period change must then be supplemented by further
considerations to arrive at the observed rate of period change for the pulses as they arrive on Earth. This
is because the relative position of any given pulsar and the Earth is always changing both due to two
bodies’ particular local solar system motions and their overall motion within the galaxy. This means
that the Doppler shift of the pulse as observed on Earth will also not be constant and there will also
be variation in the gravitational red-shifting of the signal. Most remarkably, it has been shown to be
43Much of our analysis is built upon the transcript of a fascinating discussion between Cliord Will, Julian Barbour,
Frederick Hoyle and Jurgen Ehlers, that took place during a meeting in Tübingen in 1993 (Barbour and Pster 1995, 234-6).
We will provide an extended excerpt of the key points from the discussion within our analysis of atomic clocks in §6.2.
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necessary to explicitly take account of the galactic accelerations of the pulsar and the sun in order to
arrive at an accurate understanding of the period change (Damour and Taylor 1991). This means that
we need to consider the ‘dierential acceleration between the solar system and the binary pulsar in the
eld of the Galaxy’ and thus ‘galactic gravitational eld must be modeled’ (Barbour and Pster 1995,
234-6).
It is still the case, however, that if one could isolate all the relevant physical factors that inuence
both the period change in a pulsar and which aect the pulse as it travels between the pulsar and de-
tector, then one could, in principle, correct for these factors and abstract an arbitrarily accurate local
chronometry based upon the corrected signal. This would then correspond to the proper time of an
observer moving along the same world-line as the detector. In practice, needless to say, for any given
pulsar arriving at such a comprehensive catalog of all relevant physical factors is impossible. There are
always ‘timing residuals’ which can be dened as the dierence between the observational times-of-
arrival of the pulse and those predicted by the pulsar timing model. Such residuals are particularly
signicant in the context of possible test of gravitational waves (Lommen 2015). What is important
for us is that in practice the timing residuals of any particular pulsar are signicant enough to render
a local clock based upon the corrected received pulsar signal unstable. For this reason, stable pulsar
chronometry is in practice based upon an array of pulsars each with their own, assumed to be un-
correlated, noise from their respective timing residuals. There is then a (contested) claim that timing
based upon such an array is comparable with that provided by atomic clocks (Lorimer 2008; Hartnett
and Luiten 2011).
For our purposes, what is particularly remarkable is that in attempting to separate timing noise
from the signal in pulsar timing array, one plausibly will have to lter out the gravitational wave back-
ground (GWB) common to all pulsars in the array from the (assumed to be independent) individual
timing residuals (Lorimer 2008). The gravitational wave background is a low-frequency stochastic
background produced during the big bang era. It is thus a cosmological eect. Thus, to abstract an
arbitrarily stable and accurate local measure of proper time from pulsars we do not need to just con-
sider the gravitational eld of the galaxy, we would also need to consider cosmic scale eects. Assump-
tions regarding the stability of the large scale structure of the universe are thus part of the process of
abstracting high precision local measures of time via pulsar clocks. Clearly, of course, the scope of
potential causal inuence of these cosmic scale eects cannot be extended arbitrarily. Unlike in the
case of Newtonian gravity, in general relativity causal inuence is constrained via the causal structure
of the relevant cosmological spacetime. In particular, there can be no causal inuence from bodies
outside the relevant cosmological particle horizon (Davis and Lineweaver 2004).
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These restrictions notwithstanding, the situation for pulsar based chronometry now strongly re-
sembles that for the highly idealised inertial clocks discussed in §4.1. In order to abstract a local mea-
sure of time based upon signals from pulsars, one must consider cosmic scale eects, such as grav-
itational wave background, that can exert causal inuence on the pulsar signal that is the basis for
chronometry. We have good reason to assert that a stable and accurate measurement of our local
proper time via pulsars (or any other astrophysical clock systems) will not itself be local, rather it
is interconnected via our model of galactic and possibly even cosmic scale eects. We can conclude,
therefore, that detailed consideration of astrophysical clocks in the context of general relativity serves
to allow for a weakened form of Mach’s interconnection thesis:
iii?) Relativistic Interconnection Thesis: All local abstractions of time are potentially subject to
global eects, since adequate modelling of any local physical system used for chronometry re-
quires us to consider the potential destabilising eect of the environment outside an arbitrarily
small spatiotemporal region.
It is instructive now to examine the extent to which the relativistic interconnection thesis can be ap-
plied in the case of time as measured by atomic clocks.
6.2 Atomic Clocks
During a meeting in Tübingen in 1993, following a talk by Julian Barbour, a fascinating exchange
between Barbour and Frederick Hoyle and Jurgen Ehlers took place relating to the supposed clash
between Machian views of time, in particular the interconnection thesis, as espoused by Barbour,
and the operation of atomic clocks. The transcript from the key points of debate (Barbour and Pster
1995, 234-6), runs as follows:
Hoyle: . . .my understanding is that astronomers have for quite some time used [an exceedingly
accurate atomic vibration] rather than anything connected with the sky [to measure time]
Barbour: That is, of course, true, but . . .My understanding is that time is now determined by a
system of about seven such atomic clocks, which are distributed around the world. Just like the
earth, atomic clocks have internal jitters, over which the scientists have no control.
Hoyle: There are perturbations on the system.
Barbour: Yes, and to counteract those you have to model the earth and average the clock readings.
To extract a time out of [a] network that [one] can actually use to test if the binary pulsar’s really
giving o gravitational waves, you have to model the continental drift, the Chandler wobble of the
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axis of the earth, and all these things. There is no clock from which you can simply read o time. It
does not exist. The present one is a network of such clocks with a model of the motion of the earth.
Hoyle: I think you could use a system in some other place in the universe. It need not be the earth at
all.
Barbour: Yes, but you still have got to have a complete dynamical system, and you’ve got to
parametrize the environment in which the clock is read.
Hoyle: If you reduce it to practical time, yes. But it’s a system of time in which you count the
number of oscillations of a certain transition, and that is going to be the same wherever you are in
the universe.
Barbour: With respect, Fred, that’s not a clock because an actual atomic clock is a many-body
system. An atomic clock corresponds to a complicated many-body problem of solid-state physics.
One can never get one’s hands on an oscillation of one atom like that; it just isn’t there.
Ehlers: I think you talked about proper time, which is dened in terms of atomic systems, and in
order to relate dierent proper times, you have to have a good model of the gravitational potentials
and relative motions in order to reduce them to a common time. It is unfortunate that we use just one
word. I think for science we need at least two dierent concepts, which are unfortunately denoted by
the same word, namely, we use time in a rst sense as a global parameter of events, to order them in a
certain sequence, and that is not necessarily the same as what is measured by a good clock. Secondly,
we use clocks, and we know that already in special relativity time in the rst sense is the coordinate
time of some inertial frame, and proper time is something of a dierent nature. It’s idealized by a
dierent mathematical structure and it is dierent also in its actual scientic use. Would you agree?
Hoyle: Yes, I agree entirely, because clearly there’s an innitely large number of ways in which one
can dene coordinate time, but my point is that the proper time is unique.
Ehlers: The proper time of one particular clock at one particular place.
Hoyle: At one particular place, yes.
Barbour: I would only add that, nevertheless, in order actually to measure that local proper time
one must still in principle model the universe since it is the dynamics of the universe that ultimately
‘manufactures’ proper time.
Evidently, the trajectory of this exchange in many ways parallels the Barbour-Mach response to
the Neumann-Lange inertial clocks. Moreover, it closely parallels the discussion of pulsar clocks and
the relativistic interconnection thesis iii? above. In fact, the earlier part of the discussion covers some
of the relevant details regarding pulsar clocks and was the inspiration for our present analysis. Even
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more interestingly, as noted earlier, Barbour’s line of response has several major points of strong com-
monality with the ‘model based’ account of time measurement via atomic clocks due to Tal (2016).
We will briey summarise key points from the more theoretical aspects of Tal’s magisterial analysis
before drawing the parallels with Mach and Barbour more explicitly.44
As intimated by Barbour, the time ‘measured’ by atomic clocks is based upon a standardisation
procedure involving multiple atomic clocks distributed throughout the globe. This time is known
as ‘coordinated universal time’ (UTC). Each of these individual clocks is designed to measure the
frequencies associated with specic atomic transitions, including most famously caesium. Caesium
plays a particularly important role in modern time-keeping since it is transitions of an idealised cae-
sium atom that are the basis for the denition of the second. However, as emphasised by Tal, this
does not mean that one can simply read seconds from real caesium atoms. The caesium atom that
denes the second is an idealised construct, at rest at zero degrees Kelvin and with no coupling to any
external elds. Actual atomic clocks are then built to approximately realise the ideal caesium clock,
with known sources of dierence minimised, where possible, and rigorously modelled such that the
time they ‘read’ is intimately tied to the relevant de-idealisation procedure. The clock design imple-
mented in most of these ‘primary’ standards is called a caesium fountain since it involves caesium
atoms being tossed up in a vacuum and falling under gravity. Each caesium fountain clock typically
only operates for a few weeks at a time and the primary purpose of their intermittent operation is to
calibrate secondary standards. The secondary standards are a dierent class of atomic clocks that are
less accurate but can be run continuously for a number of years. The secondary standard clocks also
must be modelled and their time readings are also based upon de-idealisation procedure. In particu-
lar, the ‘readings’ of the clocks are subject to quantitive adjustments relating to the known sources of
dierence between their ideal physical operation and their actual physical realisation. This allows the
time that they read to be a close approximation to that read by their idealised counterpart.
The crucial point is that UTC is still not ‘read’ by either primary or secondary standards, even
after taking into account de-idealisation. Rather it is a product of a further abstraction based upon
the readings of the dierent participant clocks throughout the world. Furthermore, the construction
of UTC is not based upon a simple statistical averaging of the various clocks: not only are dierent
clocks weighted dierently, since some clocks are more noisy (i.e. have a larger amount of unmodelled
disturbance), but since the clocks are at dierent physical locations on the earth one must also take
44Our focus will be upon the ‘theoretical’ rather than ‘social’ aspects of Tal’s model-based account of the practice of
scientic time measurement. Arguably, given his focus upon the evolutionary and anthropological context of scientic




account of their diering proper times, as determined by the relevant dierences in gravitational eld
and four acceleration. At this point again, one proceeds via a de-idealisation procedure that quanti-
tively corrects the measured value towards a close approximation of the idealised model. In particular:
. . . the unied timescale chosen as the basis for international timekeeping is called ‘ter-
restrial time’. Corresponding to coordinate time on the earth’s surface, this timescale is
chosen so that dierences in proper time among local clocks could be accounted for. Ide-
ally, one can imagine all of the atomic clocks that participate in global timekeeping as lo-
cated on a rotating surface of equal gravitational potential that approximates the earth’s
sea level. Such a surface is called a ‘geoid’, and terrestrial time is the time a perfectly sta-
ble clock on that surface would tell when viewed by a distant observer. However, much
like the denition of the second, the denition of terrestrial time is highly idealized and
cannot be used directly to evaluate the accuracy of any concrete clock. Moreover, unlike
primary standards, there is no practical way to evaluate the individual uncertainties of
secondary standards from rst theoretical principles. The solution is to introduce an op-
erational measure of time that would approximate terrestrial time, while also maintain-
ing a known relation to the indications of concrete clocks. This intermediary measure
of time is coordinated universal time. (Tal 2016, p. 302).
Tal’s analysis thus enables us to add considerably more esh to the bones of Barbour’s argument.
In particular, although atomic clocks are local physical systems based upon the transition of caesium
atoms, not only are they evidently in practice many bodied, but, moreover, their operation involves
modelling their environment including gravitational coupling. Moreover, the time standard ‘mea-
sured’ by atomic clocks, UTC, involves a complicated process of abstraction and aggregation. Crucial
to this process is modelling of the gravitational eld of the earth. Although, in practice, this modelling
will not necessarily require us to ‘model the universe’, in principle the deviations between the ideal
geoid gravitational eld of terrestrial time and the actual gravitational eld experienced by the clocks
will depend upon incident gravitational waves and potentially also noise induced by the GWB and
the CMB. As before, we should be careful to note that the causal inuence of galactic or possibly
cosmic scale eects is restricted to the cosmological particle horizon. Thus, it is not quite true that
one must model the ‘whole universe’ – merely the whole visible universe.45 Furthermore, the order
of magnitude of these eects is extremely small compared to the scales relevant to the modelling of
45Barbour (personal communication) has oered a fascinating line of response on this point aimed at arguing that the
interdependence can be extended across the particle horizon, notwithstanding considerations of relativistic causality. His
argument runs as follows: if the universe is spatially closed and the initial value problem is solved via the Lichnerowicz-
York equation then we can reason that all local laws of nature are emergent. In particular, the quadratic Lichnerowicz-York
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the frequency stability and frequency accuracy in contemporary atomic chronometry. Thus, unlike
in the case of pulsar clocks, operation of the current most accurate atomic clocks does not require us
to consider galactic or cosmic eects.
The crucial point here is that the requirement for the modelling of the environment and aggre-
gation of dierent clocks is not merely a product of the desire for coordination between dierent
countries atomic clocks. There is no actually physical atomic clock that can, considered in isolation,
reliably and accurately measure its own proper time. The most accurate clocks are the ‘primary stan-
dards’ which cannot be run continuously but rather are used to calibrate ‘secondary standards’. Fur-
thermore, the aggregation of the various secondary standards across dierent parts of the globe is
essential to the purpose of constructing the maximally accurate and reliable time, coordinated uni-
versal time. In principle these clocks could all be in the same lab, but they clearly could not be sit-
uated in the same arbitrarily small spatiotemporal region. In order to abstract a stable and accurate
local measure of time based upon atomic clocks, one must in practice consider global eects. The
modelling assumptions required to mediate between relativistic chronometry and real world atomic
clocks serve to support the relativistic interconnection thesis, and with it the spirit of the Machian
view of chronometry.
7 Final Thoughts
The philosophical penchant for a clean dialectic leads naturally towards simplifying caricature. And
no doubt some degree of idealisation is as necessary in philosophy as it is in science. No doubt also,
when dealing with a prolic, long dead historical thinker, whose peak of reputation has long past,
there is a tendency to reach for an easy label. Not least when application of such a label is an argu-
mentative means for a dismissal, and an excuse to read no more. But such a supercial mode of analysis
serves neither the present nor the past anywhere near well enough. We hope that in this essay such a
moral has been well exemplied. The Machian view of time belongs in neither the naïve relationalist
nor conventionalist camp. His views were not dim, nor shallow, nor confused, and are not refuted
by the notion of inertial clocks, nor made redundant by relativistic chronometry. The Machian view
of time is rich, subtle, and still relevant. As such, it warrants our careful, considered, and continuing
attention.
equation and the linear equations of York’s method for solving the ADM initial-value equations are ‘laws of the instant’.
This means that they hold across the cosmological particle horizon. Thus the determination of local time is cosmologically
determined if the universe is spatially closed.
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